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Article 2

The New Welfare Rights
Susannah Camic Tahk†
INTRODUCTION
Participating in the tax system gives rise to rights. These
rights range from a fundamental property right in a tax refund
to the robust taxpayer rights found in statutes. In the past three
decades, Congress and the IRS have continued to protect,
strengthen and build on these rights.1
Several foundational ideas underlie all the taxpayer
rights and perhaps partially explain ongoing political interest in
sustaining them. For one, in the tax context, U.S. taxpayers have
become particularly interested in maintaining both property
rights themselves and rights limiting what the government can
do in connection with its taxing power. For another, taxpayers
submit to the taxing power and sustain the government through
their contributions. Those taxes serve as consideration in a

† Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Associate Professor
of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School and Affiliate, Institute for Research on
Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison. For invaluable discussions and help, thanks
to John Balz, Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Charles Camic, Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Christopher
Griffin, Andrew Hammond, Alexandra Huneeus, Heinz Klug, Ion Meyn, Margaret
Raymond, Michelle Schwarze, Miriam Seifter, Alex Tahk and the faculty of the
University of Michigan Law School. For some of the most productive and fun
conversations while writing this article, special thanks to Serena Tahk, who has yet to
learn the word “tax.” For funding support, thanks to the John Rowe Fellowship in
Regulatory Law and the Vilas Early Career Investigator Award at the University of
Wisconsin. For outstanding research assistance, thanks to Sean Fernandes, Chelsea
Fischer, Caitlin Holzem, Molly Malloy, Olivia Pietrantoni. Samuel Robins, Anne Terrien,
Taryn Trujillo and Tiffany Woelfel. All errors are my own.
1 I will discuss in detail later in the paper, multiple pieces of legislation with
the title “Taxpayer Bill of Rights.” See, e.g., Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6226, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730 (containing the “Omnibus
Taxpayer Bill of Rights,” known as “TBOR 1”); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No.
104-168, § 1, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (known as “TBOR 2”); Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3000, 112 Stat. 685, 726
(containing the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, known as “TBOR 3”); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 401, 129 Stat. 2242, 3117 (2015). For
an excellent discussion of these bills, see Amanda Bartmann, Making Taxpayer Rights
Real: Overcoming Challenges to Integrate Taxpayer Rights into a Tax Agency’s
Operations, 69 TAX LAW. 597 (2016) (describing these efforts briefly and making policy
recommendations for agency reforms that would incorporate the legislation).
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social compact.2 As a result, tax law sustains a potentially robust
rights framework, particularly in the past three decades.
At the same time, another law and policymaking trend
has emerged. The federal government has increasingly been
embedding social policy in the tax code.3 One area in which this
has occurred is in its approach to fighting poverty.4 Many of the
U.S.’s antipoverty programs now appear in the tax code. For
example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is currently the
federal government’s largest antipoverty program.5 The Child
Tax Credit has also become a major income support program.6
Accompanying it are the Child Care Tax Credit7 and Dependent
Care Assistance Exclusion,8 which jointly subsidize the childcare
expenses of middle- and low-income families. The American
Opportunity9 and Lifetime Learning10 credits assist middle- and
low-income individuals in paying educational expenses. The
Premium Assistance Credit partially covers health insurance

2 Putting aside the theoretical foundations of the idea of a social compact, to
which I will return briefly later, research has shown that norms of reciprocity motivate
many taxpayers not just to pay some taxes, but to comply as best they can with the letter
of tax law. See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691, 696 (2009) (arguing for different types
of tax compliance regimes for “rational gamer[s]” and taxpayers motivated by norms of
reciprocity or other social norms).
3 For a discussion of that phenomenon, see generally Susannah Camic Tahk,
Everything is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67 (2013) (describing the many social-policy areas that the tax code
now encompasses and highlighting some of the advantages of conducting social policy
through the tax code).
4 See generally Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV.
791 (2014) (detailing the antipoverty programs now contained in the tax code and describing
some of the reasons for and implications of this tax-code shift); Len Burman & Elaine Maag,
The War on Poverty Moves to the Tax Code, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 6, 2014), http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001711-The-War-onPoverty-Moves-to-the-Tax-Code.PDF [https://perma.cc/QN95-GCZW] (covering briefly some
of the tax provisions that address poverty).
5 I.R.C. § 32 (2012); John Karl Scholz et al., Trends in Income Support, 26
FOCUS 43, 43–49 (2009) (measuring the size of various federal antipoverty programs); see
also Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of Redistribution? An Analysis of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 74 MO. L. REV. 251, 254 (2009) (considering the EITC generally in
light of its growth over the past several decades); Hilary Hoynes, The Earned Income
Tax Credit, Welfare Reform, and the Employment of Low-Skilled Single Mothers, in
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF WORKERS: BRIDGING RESEARCH
AND PRACTICE 65–77 (Maude Toussaint-Comeau & Bruce D. Meyer eds., 2009) (noting
how substantial the EITC has become relative to other federal antipoverty programs);
Jonathan P. Schneller, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Administration of Tax
Expenditures, 90 N.C. L. REV. 719, 725 (2012) (discussing the significance of EITC
growth along with some of its administrative problems).
6 I.R.C. § 24 (West 2015).
7 Id.
8 Id. § 129 (2012).
9 Id. § 25A(i).
10 Id. § 25A(c).
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costs for middle- and low-income taxpayers.11 Then, more
indirectly, the Low-Income Housing Credit aims to help with the
housing shortage that poor Americans face.12 Furthermore, the
New Markets Tax Credit13 stimulates investment in low-income
communities and the Work Opportunity Credit14 provides
incentives to create jobs for members of hard-to-employ social
groups. Finally, organizations concerned with poverty relief
receive tax subsidies in the form of tax exemptions and the
ability to receive tax-deductible contributions.15
As the United States has bolstered and amplified
taxpayer rights and moved a substantial volume of its antipoverty
policy into the tax code, a third development has unfolded—the
decline of “welfare rights.” Scholars and advocates working in
poverty law have lamented the decline of what had historically
been called “welfare rights.” During the War on Poverty in the
1960s, lawyers and grassroots social movements had once worked
to build a rights framework for low-income individuals through the
welfare system. Historians and legal academics, however, have
noted the ways in which that effort fell short of expectations.16
After that, the welfare reform bill of 1996 specified that,
in contrast to past direct-spending income support programs, its
welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) would not be an “entitlement.”17 That provision called
into doubt even the limited welfare rights that courts had
recognized during the War on Poverty.18
Id. § 36B.
Id. § 42.
13 Id. § 45D.
14 Id. § 51.
15 Id. §§ 501(a), (c)(3).
16 For example, historian of the welfare rights movement Martha F. Davis has
described the War on Poverty welfare rights litigation strategy as an “ultimate failure,”
in large part due to the “short duration” of the accompanying social movement and the
lack of “time to develop a legal strategy tailored to the dynamics of poverty advocacy.”
MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1960–1973 143 (1993).
17 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2012)). 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) mandated that TANF shall not be construed “to entitle
any individual or family to assistance.”
18 Legal historian Karen Tani summarized a widespread view in the Yale Law
Journal when she wrote that “[t]he 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act ‘ended welfare as we know it’ in large part by eliminating rights
claims.” Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language
of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 381 (2012) (quoting MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF
CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1 (1st ed. 2001); see also
FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN
MODERN AMERICA 185 (2007) (“The welfare rights era has ended . . . .”); Lucy A.
Williams, Welfare and Legal Entitlements: The Social Roots of Poverty, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 569–70 (David Kairys, ed., 3d ed. 1998). Randal
11
12
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Even as courts and Congress have cast doubt upon lowincome individuals’ welfare rights, however, tax law has opened
the door to a new set of rights—the same rights that any
taxpayer has. Despite the increasingly shaky legal foundations
of welfare rights, the growing number of people who receive
increasingly large benefits through the tax code have associated
rights. The substantial literature on low-income individuals’
weakening rights after the end of the 1960s War on Poverty and
welfare reform has not sufficiently recognized that in fact lowincome individuals have other substantial rights under the tax
code. Those rights are merely grounded in tax law rather than
welfare law and can be more fully pursued in that way. As the
federal government has moved away from direct-spending
antipoverty programs toward the tax code, so has the basis of
beneficiaries’ rights claims. Rights derived from tax law have
strong legal foundations, both theoretical and practical. These
are not rights that lawmakers are attempting to weaken, but
rather, they are rights that lawmakers are attempting to
strengthen. In addition, low-income individual’s rights through
the tax system would not only be theoretically and practically
robust in and of themselves, but would also offer a vision of equal
citizenship that welfare rights did not.
Notably, rights derived from the tax system have the
advantage that they would not distinguish between deserving
and undeserving taxpayers, rich taxpayers and poor taxpayers,
Jeffrey has written that, “The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 threatens the due process protections that, for over thirty
years, have applied to public assistance programs throughout the country.” Randal S.
Jeffrey, The Importance of Due Process Protections After Welfare Reform: Client Stories
from New York City, 66 ALB. L. REV. 123, 123, 125–27 (2002) (footnote omitted) (studying
due process in action in the years immediately following welfare reform). The case that
considered this issue, Weston v. Cassata, held that at least in Colorado, welfare recipients
do retain some due-process rights protections. Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 477 (Colo.
App. 2001). For further discussion of the issue of welfare reform and rights, all
expressing some degree of uncertainty or pessimism about the issue, see Christine N.
Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
89, 125–32 (2002); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 603–23 (2001); Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing
“Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN.
L. REV. 591, 618–23 (1998); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1337–38 (2012); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the
Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997). In his landmark book,
The Price of Citizenship, historian Michael Katz wrote broadly that welfare reform and
concurrent policy developments “suggested that rights are contingent—they may be
withdrawn as well as extended, contracted as well as expanded.” MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE
PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 345 (2d ed. 2008).
[hereinafter, KATZ, 2008] (citing Robert Henry Cox, The Consequences of Welfare Reform:
How Conceptions of Social Rights Are Changing, 27 J. SOC. POL’Y 1 (1998)); see generally
William E. Nelson, Two Models of Welfare: Private Charity versus Public Duty, 7 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 295 (1998).
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or taxpayers who take advantage of widely available benefits
and taxpayers whose benefits are narrowly tailored. Property
rights in a tax refund are the same rights afforded in principle,
offering the same legal protections, regardless of whether the
taxpayer is a large publicly-traded corporation or an EITC
recipient. The legislative and administrative rules written to
safeguard taxpayer rights apply to any taxpayer sending a
return to the IRS or disputing a liability or collections action. As
a result, the IRS must improve how it helps poor taxpayers
navigate a system not designed for them.
Recognizing the rights of poor taxpayers would also bring
with it many concrete implications for policy, law and
administration. Considering the legal framework of taxpayer
rights opens many potential paths for low-income taxpayers to
mobilize these rights. I will highlight two in this paper. First,
the rights framework offers avenues for challenging IRS and even
legislative practices. This paper will discuss a few examples of
situations in which poor recipients of tax benefits can make
rights-based legal claims. Second, focusing on the rights that poor
taxpayers may assert suggests ways to improve administrative
design, particularly to address access to justice issues. This article
will present preliminary results from a pilot survey experiment
aimed to address this problem. This experiment is only one of
many possible interventions that explicitly uses rights-based
ideas to help tax administration protect poor taxpayers’ rights
more effectively. Poor taxpayers have the right, grounded in both
general property rights theory as well as specific legislation, to
pay no more than the correct amount of tax. When the IRS audits
a poor taxpayer, however, standard practice is to freeze at least
part of the refund until the taxpayer submits additional documents
substantiating her credit claim.19 Data show that, at least in the
case of EITC recipients, 60–70 percent of taxpayers never respond
to Form CP-75, the letter asking for the documents.20 As a result,
many poor taxpayers, even those with the legal right to the full
refund, lose their refund. My proposed intervention focuses on the
19 AM. BAR ASS’N, LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS, DISCUSSION POINTS FOR
EITC AUDITS (2008), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
taxation/migrated/eitc.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J6J-P8EA]; see also Email
from Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Assoc. Clinical Professor of Law, Washington & Lee Law
School, to author (Mar. 22, 2014, 11:20 PM CDT) (on file with author).
20 Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those Who
Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11
PITT. TAX REV. 113, 137 (2013); Understanding Your CP75 Notice, IRS (last updated Mar.
6, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/understanding-your-cp75-notice [https://
perma.cc/S2XM-QBSD] (notice sent to taxpayer alerting them that the IRS is requesting
“documentation to verify the Earned Income Tax Credit . . . claimed”).
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rights of poor taxpayers to solve this problem. The pilot experiment
provides evidence that incorporating taxpayer rights more
explicitly into Form CP-75 may help to protect those.
The article proceeds from here in two parts. Part I argues
that, in contrast to current narratives about the decline of lowincome individuals’ rights, low-income individuals actually have
and have yet to fully realize robust rights arising from the fact
that they obtain their benefits through the tax system. Part II
then moves to the practical implications of recognizing poor
taxpayers’ rights, suggesting a few ways in which poor taxpayers
might assert or otherwise use rights claims in their interactions
with the IRS. In particular, the Part looks at one potential
example: Form CP-75. This Part presents the results of a pilot
survey experiment aimed at testing a rights-based improvement
to that form.
I.

RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH TAX BENEFITS

Literature from poverty law on welfare rights has
observed that since the direct-spending War on Poverty, welfare
rights have never been particularly robust. The 1996 welfare
reform law cast uncertainty upon even these rights.
Additionally, welfare rights were rooted in a system stemming
from the colonial period that created hierarchical tiers of
government beneficiaries. In the past three decades, however,
the war on poverty has moved into the tax code. Benefits
administered through the tax system bring with them their own
robust rights. As a result, low-income recipients of government
benefits now have a new set of rights: the rights associated with
having paid taxes and having a tax refund. These rights rest on
a deep theoretical foundation and have manifested themselves
concretely in case law, statutes, and administrative guidance.
Indeed, they present a vision of equal citizenship across the
range of government beneficiaries.
A.

Rights in Direct-Spending Antipoverty Programs

Historically, the United States has fought poverty
through direct-spending programs. These have included incomesupport programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and TANF, as well as programs subsidizing other needs
of poor families and individuals, such as housing assistance, food
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stamps, and health care.21 These direct-spending programs
proliferated and expanded during President Lyndon Johnson’s
War on Poverty, which began in 1964.22 In its wake, a grassroots
“welfare rights” movement and its lawyers attempted to
establish rights for recipients of direct-spending antipoverty
programs.23 Those efforts led to courts setting forth rights for
government beneficiaries.24 The scope of those rights, however,
remained somewhat uncertain and relevant case law reflected
some of the theoretical difficulties of the welfare rights
movement, including its hierarchies among different types of
beneficiaries. Then, in 1996, the federal government reformed
welfare in a way that cast further doubt on the rights associated
with receiving antipoverty benefits.25 The academic literature in
poverty law expressed concern about what it saw as an
accelerated weakening of low-income individuals’ rights.26
1. Welfare Rights Law in the 1960s War on Poverty
During the earlier War on Poverty, as poverty law
professor Stephen Loffredo wrote, “scholars, lawyers and
community organizers recognized that law reform might play an
important catalytic role in promoting movements for social
change.”27 The movement that emerged in this period counted as
21 For a recent overview of these programs, see KAREN SPAR & GENE FALK,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44574, FEDERAL BENEFITS AND SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH
LOW INCOME: OVERVIEW OF SPENDING TRENDS, FY2008-FY2015 (2016).
22 President Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1964 State of the Union Address, C-SPAN
(Jan. 8, 1964), http://www.c-span.org/video/?153275-1/state-union-address [https://
perma.cc/4SBZ-2XLV]. Programs contained in President Johnson’s War on Poverty
included among others, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Job Corps, Volunteers
in Service to America, Upward Bound, Head Start, Legal Services, the Neighborhood
Youth Corps, the Community Action Program, small business loan programs, rural
programs, migrant worker programs, remedial education projects, local healthcare
centers, food stamps, and Medicare and Medicaid. See Kent Germany, War on Poverty,
in POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS AND POLICY
774–82 (Alice O’Connor & Gwendolyn Mink eds., 2004).
23 See generally DAVIS, supra note 16.
24 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that indigent
women seeking to dissolve their marriages could obtain access to courts); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding procedural due process required a hearing before a
decision to terminate welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(holding certain residency requirements for welfare unconstitutional); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth. of Durham, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (holding that public housing evictions similarly
required hearings). For a description of these and other cases in the War on Poverty, see
generally Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor? 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745 (1992).
25 See, e.g., Cimini, supra note 18, at 125–32; Jeffrey, supra note 18, at 125–27.
26 See, e.g., Cimini, supra note 18, at 125–32; Jeffrey, supra note 18, at 125–
27; Tani, supra note 18, at 381.
27 Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 173 (2001).
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two of its many goals as “establish[ing] legal protections for
welfare recipients” and “chang[ing] the face of social policy.”28 As
Professor Davis described, the legal component of the welfare
rights movement had “positive aspects”29 but ended in a
“failure”30 with “bruising defeats.”31The case law developed
during the welfare rights movement has been the subject of
numerous articles and casebook chapters. It is too long to review
fully here.32
Perhaps the cases most relevant for this discussion, and
also some of the best known, consider the property rights that
attach to welfare payments. In the landmark case of Goldberg v
Kelly, the Supreme Court held that recipients of public cash
assistance have at least some property right in their benefits and
are therefore entitled to procedural due process under Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically, a
pre-termination hearing before an impartial adjudicator.33
Goldberg considered welfare recipients in New York City whose
cash assistance had been terminated after the welfare agency
had merely sent a notification letter.34 The court held that
“[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them.”35 “The extent to which procedural due
process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent
to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss’”36 and
then, “whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss

28 PREMILLA
NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES xiv (2005).
29 DAVIS, supra note 16, at 143.
30 Id.
31 Redlich, supra note 24, at 747.
32 For some of the various components and issues addressed in these cases, see,
e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (Social Security disability benefits and
children with unmarried parents); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (food stamps and unrelated household members); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school financing); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972)
(indigent peoples’ court costs); Lindsey v Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (due process and
eviction); Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971) (certain categories of illegitimate
children); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (non-citizens and state welfare
residency tests); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent peoples’ court
costs); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (welfare caseworkers’ visits); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (imprisonment and involuntary nonpayment of fines);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare residence requirements); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (unmarried couples and welfare); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of
Durham, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (due process and eviction).
33 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
34 Id. at 258.
35 Id. at 262.
36 Id. at 262–63 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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summary
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adjudication.”
The Court noted that the lack of a hearing for these
plaintiffs caused them to become “immediately desperate,”
something they found to be a sufficiently “grievous loss.”38 The
Court held that, “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to
the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”39
Specifically, “[i]t is not enough that a welfare recipient may present
his position to the decision maker in writing or secondhand
through his caseworker.”40 The Court found that, “[w]ritten
submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack
the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who
cannot obtain professional assistance,”41 “do not afford the
flexibility of oral presentations,”42 and “do not permit the recipient
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to
regard as important.”43 In particular, “where credibility and
veracity are at issue, as they must be in many termination
proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis
for decision.”44
The Goldberg decision rested in large part on an influential
law review article, Charles Reich’s The New Property.45 In it “Reich
argued for a new vision of government benefits that would give
them the status of more traditional property.”46 As Professor Davis
described, this idea was “quickly taken up by legal services
lawyers,” enthusiastic about the opportunity to enshrine legally
this broad concept of property.47 In litigating Goldberg, advocates
grappled with the extent to which they should base their
arguments on the article’s expanded view of property, “afraid that
it would scare the justices.”48
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263–64 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 168).
39 Id. at 268–69.
40 Id. at 269.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
46 DAVIS, supra note 16, at 85; see also Reich, supra note 45.
47 Id. at 86 (citing Edward V. Sparer, The New Public Law: The Relationship
of State Administration to the Legal Problems of the Poor, Presentation before the
Conference on the Extension of Legal Services to the Poor, Dep’t of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 12, 1964), reprinted in 23 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE (1965),
and Edward V. Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, 12 PRAC. LAW. 30 (1966)). Sparer
graduated from Brooklyn Law School and, in 1985, the school established a public
interest fellowship program in his name. See Sparer Fellowship, BROOK. L. SCH.,
https://www.brooklaw.edu/academics/sparerpublicinterestlawfellowship/overview? [https://
perma.cc/BCX2-93JS].
48 DAVIS, supra note 16, at 104.
37

38
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Similarly, the lawyers involved in the War on Poverty
cases struggled with how much to rest their approach on a broad
“right to live.” Edward Sparer, sometimes considered the
movement’s legal leader, felt it “imperative” that the lawyers “use
Goldberg to advance the theory.”49 However, Lee Albert, one of the
lawyers who argued the case before the Supreme Court
“maintained that it was a kooky idea that would never be adopted
by the Supreme Court.”50 In fact, it became one of the primary
points of controversy at oral argument (and in the justices’ later
deliberations over the case).51 Advocates “knew that it was
important to respond to [the Court’s] concern that if the plaintiffs
won the case it would henceforth be impossible for Congress to
repeal any government benefit program.”52 “Ironically, that was the
ultimate goal of the welfare rights litigation strategy: a guaranteed
minimum income constitutionally secured by the right to live.”53
The decision eventually included some of the right-to-live
language, noting that, “[f]rom its founding the Nation’s basic
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all
persons within its borders”54 and that “forces not within the control
of the poor contribute to their poverty”55 Further, “[w]elfare, by
meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within
the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to
others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community”
and therefore is “a means to ‘promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’”56
Justice Brennan included more along those lines in his initial
draft of the opinion, but cut back after Justice Harlan labeled
the additional material “offensive” and Justice White “flatly
refused to accept it.”57
The Court’s skepticism surrounding a “right to live” was
what eventually led to the demise of the welfare rights litigation
movement. In 1967, Congress passed a bill that would curtail
AFDC by setting up mandatory work training programs and
cutting benefits by freezing the number of children covered by
Id.
Id. at 103.
51 Id. at 106–18 (describing in detail both the oral argument and the deliberations).
52 Id. at 109.
53 Id.
54 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970).
55 Id. at 265.
56 Id.
57 DAVIS, supra note 16, at 113 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 378 (1988)); Draft Letter from John M. Harlan to
William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice John M. Harlan Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library, Princeton University, B378 F62)).
49
50
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federal matching grants.58 Welfare rights advocates took the
position that the family maximums “ha[d] the effect of treating
needy children differently based on an arbitrary standard not
related to the purpose of AFDC—the size of the family,” also in
violation of the equal protection clause.59 In Dandridge v.
Williams, lawyers were able to raise the equal protection
argument before the Supreme Court, and the parties’ briefs
specifically referenced the right to live, saying that the family
maximums “affects the availability of the fundamental
rudiments of human existence.”60 The Court, however, rejected
this argument, ruling 5–3 in favor of the family maximums.61
Justice Stewart’s decision “went out of his way to repudiate
[earlier suggestions] that had fueled hopes that the Court would
eventually uphold a fundamental right to live.”62 The Court
decided several other cases involving the 1967 welfare law
during this period,63and in all of them, Court stepped away from
developing government beneficiaries’ rights.
On the specific question discussed in Goldberg of what
level of process is sufficient to satisfy procedural due process
requirements, rights advocates after Goldberg have faced
similar challenges. In Mathews v. Eldridge, decided six years
after Goldberg, the Supreme Court considered the due process
protections required for terminating federal Social Security
disability benefits.64 The former recipients argued that they had
a property right in their benefits, and therefore the Social
Security Administration needed to give them a fair hearing
before termination as a matter of procedural due process under
the Fifth Amendment.65
The Court rejected this position. Citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
it held only that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”66
Specifically, the Court set forth the now-famous three-factor test
58 Id. at 119 (citing Poverty: The Welfare Labyrinth, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28,
1967, at 25).
59 Id. at 130.
60 Brief of Amici Curiae: The Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, National
Welfare Rights Organization, Associated Catholic Charities, and Seven Neighborhood Legal
Services Offices Now Prosecuting Similar Cases at 16, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (No. 131), 1969 WL 119897 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief].
61 Dandrige, 397 U.S. at 472–88; DAVIS, supra note 16, at 132 (citing Amici
Curiae Brief, supra note 60).
62 DAVIS, supra note 16, at 132.
63 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Rothstein v. Wyman, 303
F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated, 398 U.S. 275.
64 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
65 Id. at 324–25.
66 Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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for satisfying procedural due process in the benefits context. In
identifying possible procedural due process problems, courts must
weigh (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”67
In light of those three factors, the Court in Matthews held
that Social Security termination process did not violate the
dictates of procedural due process.68 Of particular importance to
the Court was the fact that, in its view, Social Security
beneficiaries did not need their assistance as badly as the
welfare recipients in Goldberg needed theirs.69 In fact,
“[e]ligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon
financial need.”70 and is “unrelated the worker’s income or
support from many other sources.”71 Moreover, “[i]n addition to
the possibility of access to private resources, other forms of
government assistance will become available where the
termination of disability benefits places worker or his family
below the subsistence level.”72 As a result, when dealing with the
Social Security Administration did not need to provide pretermination hearings as a matter of procedural due process.73
After these cases, lawyers working on issues pertaining
to government benefits and rights hit a wall. As Professor Davis
described, “[L]awyers and welfare recipient activists cast about
for a plan of action to frame legislative and litigation efforts
[but] . . . no plan was forthcoming.”74 Summarizing the outlook
of the approximately thirty prominent welfare-rights lawyers
she interviewed, she terms their efforts overall a “failure.”75 To
take another example, assessing the current state of welfare
rights law, Professor Loffredo writes:
By the 1970s, the Supreme Court had definitively placed positive
rights outside the domain of federal constitutional law, rejecting not
only a narrow welfarist conception of minimum entitlements, but also
the broader idea that the Constitution embraces a right of social
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 335.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 348.
DAVIS, supra note 16, at 4–5.
Id. at 18.
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citizenship. Moreover, by applying only the most feeble and
deferential form of rationality review to laws affecting the poor, the
Court allowed state and federal welfare programs to function as
instruments of subordination that debased and stigmatized the poor
and served to perpetuate inequality and indignity.76

Further, Professor Loffredo makes the point that the legal
component of the antipoverty movement has never rebounded
because “[t]he number of lawyers engaged in legal work for the poor
has declined over the last two decades, and the dominant political
culture structurally and affirmatively discourages civic participation
and activism by [low-income individuals].”77
In addition to the legal barriers that the War on Poverty
lawyers eventually encountered, persistent hierarchies
undergirded the system of public benefits advocated worked
within. A number of scholars have documented that the welfare
state was “two-tiered,” as a result of race and gender
stereotypes, as well as related ideas about the “deserving” and
“undeserving” poor. The tier-structures had a number of
deficiencies but central to the deficiencies was the notion that
some government beneficiaries merited higher status and
stronger rights with regard to their benefits than others.
2. Welfare Rights After 1996 Reform
At the start of the 1990s, uncertainty surrounded lowincome individuals’ rights regarding government benefits. The
1960s and 1970s movement to enshrine those rights had met a
troubled end. At the same time, the benefits programs continued
to espouse the view that the federal government owed different
things to different groups of citizens. The 1996 welfare reform
legislation cast further doubt on low-income individuals’ rights.78
Loffredo, supra note 27, at 179–80 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 175 (citing LEGAL SERVS. CORP., TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1998–99); Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services
for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2000, at A1 http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/17/business/legalfirms-cutting-back-on-free-services-for-poor.html. [https://perma.cc/U55F-9D3E]); see also
Redlich, supra note 24, at 757–74 (documenting the decline in legal services in the past
several decades and exploring its consequences for poverty law)).
78 This bill changed the legal framework surrounding cash welfare, and only
had secondary consequences for other antipoverty programs which remained more or
less subject to the same rights as before the legislation passed. In terms of due process,
those rights rested on the holding in Mathews. Those programs also each have their own
statutory rights. In the case of many antipoverty programs, these depend on federal
legislation but also on state statutes that are of course different in all fifty states. A
review of all the rights for all of these programs goes beyond the scope of this article, but
for a helpful overview, see generally David A. Super, The Political Economy of
Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 (2004). For an excellent discussion of the rights
issues in disability programs, see generally Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion:
The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996).
76

77
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In that year, Congress passed and President signed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA),79
overhauling the federal legislation governing cash assistance.
The bill implemented the TANF program in place of the former
AFDC. PRWORA limited lifetime receipt to sixty months80 and
restricted eligibility for cash assistance in a number of ways.81
Most prominently, the bill required recipients to work in
exchange for benefits, allowing states discretion over how to
implement this mandate,82 thus giving the states substantial
authority to develop their own rules for cash assistance.
Whereas the federal government had administered AFDC
directly, the bill allotted block grants to states to run TANF.83
Along with the changes to the current law, the bill
specified that while AFDC had been a federal “entitlement,” the
new program would not be considered an entitlement.84 The
word “entitlement” appeared many times throughout the Senate
and House Congressional reports on the bill.85
As part of the legislation, federal lawmakers also shut down
one of the main avenues by which courts could define the scope of
the entitlement provision. Regulations promulgated under the
bill’s authority prohibited legal-services organizations—the
79 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 8
and 42 of the U.S.C.).
80 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 608(a)(7)(A), (C)(ii) (West 1997).
81 Id. §§ 408(a)(1)–(8); id. §§ 601–603.
82 Id. §§ 601–603.
83 Id. §§ 603, 604.
84 Id. § 601(b) (“This [legislation] shall not be interpreted to entitle any
individual or family to assistance.”).
85 For example, from the Senate report on the bill:

Senator Cohen: Those [1988] reforms did not do enough to help us distinguish
those who had fallen on hard times and needed a helping hand from those who
simply refused to act in a disciplined and responsible manner. When welfare
is a Federal entitlement, it is very difficult to make that distinction. . . . The
Federal Government is ending the 60-year philosophy that anyone at anytime
is entitled to cash assistance.
142 CONG. REC. S9399 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statements of Sen. Cohen)
Senator Nickles: Mr. President, this bill changes the way we do welfare. The
so-called AFDC, [A]id to [F]amilies with [D]ependent [C]hildren, will no longer
be a cash entitlement. We are reforming its entitlement status. The current
program says that if you meet eligibility standards—in other words, if you are
poor—you can receive this benefit for the rest of your life. There is no real
incentive to get off.
142 CONG. REC. S9356 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles). Or, from the
House report, Representative Meyers: “The Personal Responsibility Act is a good start
toward reforming our welfare system. Because of the block grant, the entitlement nature
of the program is ended.” 142 CONG. REC. H9398 (daily ed. July 31, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Meyers).

2018]

THE NEW WELFARE RIGHTS

889

primary drivers of the welfare rights litigation during the initial
War on Poverty—from “participat[ing] in . . . litigation, lobbying or
rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare
system.”86 This rule substantially reduced the amount of welfare
rights litigation in the United States, causing legal aid caseloads to
fall by millions of cases and putting hundreds of legal aid lawyers
out of work.87 In addition, PRWORA set in place a handful of what
public benefits expert David Super has called “paltry” legal
rights,88 including the right for recipients to not be sanctioned
for failing to work because of a lack of child care for
preschoolers89 and to receive assistance from secular providers
when the state elects to contract with religious organizations.90
Following PRWORA’s promulgation, states developed
their own entitlement provisions. In her study of these
provisions, Professor Cimini found that five states developed
explicit statutory provisions creating an entitlement to cash
assistance,91 and seventeen states enacted statutory provisions
that expressly denied such an entitlement.92 The remaining
states remained silent on the entitlement question. According to
Professor Cimini, “[n]otwithstanding such express provisions,
some ambiguity still exists as to whether states explicitly
denying a statutory entitlement have created state statutory
entitlements to assistance.”93
Only a handful of states have taken up the question of
whether due process or other rights that might attach to cash
assistance. In Weston v. Cassata, the Colorado Court of Appeals
held that TANF recipients do have some procedural due process
rights.94 Weston was a class action challenging the validity of pretermination TANF sanction notices.95 The “notices did not include
full or accurate information about the sanctions and the appeal
process.”96 The court discussed the history of the 1996 reforms,
noting that, “Congress intended to eliminate the ‘entitlement
86 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3 (2017). For a description of these regulations, see Laura
Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest Law Practice:
1975—2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1616–17 (2006); Marina Zaloznaya & Laura Beth
Nielsen, Mechanisms and Consequences of Professional Marginality: The Case of Poverty
Lawyers Revisited, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 925 (2011).
87 Zaloznaya & Nielsen, supra note 86, at 925.
88 Super, supra note 78, at 638.
89 42 U.S.C.A. § 607(e)(2) (West 1997).
90 Id. § 604a(e)(1).
91 Cimini, supra note 18, at 101.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 103.
94 Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 477 (Colo. App. 2001).
95 Id. at 472.
96 Id.
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mentality’ behind the existing welfare system by removing
individual entitlement to cash benefits and making welfare
benefits temporary and conditional.”97 On the other hand, the court
also considered the language in PRWORA mandating payment to
eligible individuals.98 The court therefore concluded that although
cash assistance recipients no longer have “absolute” entitlement
like they did under AFDC, recipients do retain a more limited
entitlement that was sufficient to trigger due process protections.99
Then, in State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
Human Res, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
specifically held that Goldberg’s due process requirements no
longer applied to cash assistance post-PRWORA.100 The case
concerned TANF recipients who had lost or were about to lose
their benefits as a result of the sixty-month time limit. These
beneficiaries challenged the loss on constitutional grounds,
alleging, among other things, that because of the precedent set
in Goldberg West Virginia needed to conduct a pre-termination
hearing.101 The West Virginia court observed that Congress and
the West Virginia legislature had “made sweeping changes to
this area of the law,” in 1996, “chief among them” the “no
entitlement” provisions.102 The court found that, as a result,
“Congress and the Legislature intended a clear break with the
past practice of providing cash assistance of unlimited duration
to the poor.”103 Additionally, the “primary authority on this issue
is inapposite, as Goldberg was written before the 1996 Act and
concerned rights under the old benefit scheme.”104
As a result of cases like these, the nature of legal rights
attaching to direct-spending cash assistance remains unclear.
Public benefits expert Professor Super has written that some of
this confusion stems from the fact that “[t]o a lawyer, an
entitlement is a legally enforceable right. . . . That usage,
however, although sensible enough, is generally not what
participants in legislative debates have in mind when they
attack or defend ‘entitlements.’”105 Unfortunately, the case law
has, as discussed, heavily weighed the statutory use of the word
“entitlement” when defining public benefits recipients’ legal
Id. at 474.
Id. at 474–75.
99 Id. at 475–77.
100 State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 575 S.E.2d 393,
402 (W. Va. 2004).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Super, supra note 78, at 638 (footnotes omitted).
97

98
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rights. As a result, the 1996 legislation muddied the rights
landscape for these beneficiaries. Scholars working in this area
have observed that PRWORA and the subsequent murky case
law step away from the position that cash assistance recipients
have robust right (insofar as they ever did). For instance,
administrative law professor Jon Michaels has written that the
goal and result of the bill were “to shift the terms of public
assistance away from a rights-oriented entitlement.”106 As
quoted above, Professor Tani has written that, welfare reform
accomplished its goals “in large part by eliminating rights
claims.”107 “Under the terms of the new law,” she says, “welfare
payments were an incentive, not a right; their termination was
an unobjectionable form of discipline, not a rights violation.”108
While historians, and legal scholars were focused on the
paucity of the rights claims successfully made during the War
on Poverty, another shift was occurring in U.S. antipoverty
policy. The war on poverty was being waged through the tax
code. A previously unrecognized consequence of these continued
efforts are additional rights.
This war’s standard-bearer, the EITC, has grown
substantially since its enactment during the Nixon
administration.109 The EITC provides cash assistance to low106 Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of
Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
573, 595 (2004) (citing Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and
Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2001)).
107 Tani, supra note 18, at 381.
108 Id.
109 For a snapshot of the extensive scholarship about this program, see
generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); Bird-Pollan, supra note 5; Marsha
Blumenthal et al., Participation and Compliance With the Earned Income Tax Credit, 58
NAT’L TAX J. 189 (2005); Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of
Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103 (2006);
Dorothy A. Brown, Race & Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007);
Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Labor
Supply of Married Couples, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (1998); Sara Sternberg Greene,
The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal
for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013); Hoynes, supra note 5; David Neumark &
William Wascher, Using the EITC to Help Poor Families: New Evidence and a
Comparison With the Minimum Wage, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 281 (2001); Kerry Ryan, EITC As
Income (In)Stability?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 583 (2014); Jonathan P. Schneller et al., The
Earned Income Tax Credit, Low-Income Workers, and the Legal Aid Community, 3
COLUM. J. TAX. L. 177 (2012); Schneller, supra note 5; David A. Super, Privatization,
Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 438–41 (2008); Laura Tach & Sarah
Halpern-Meekin, Tax Code Knowledge and Behavioral Responses Among EITC
Recipients: Policy Insights from Qualitative Data, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 413
(2014); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare By Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC,
56 AM. U.L. REV. 1261 (2007); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of
Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004); Laura Wheaton & Elaine
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income families in proportion to their earned income up to a
certain limit, above which the credit phases out.110 The EITC is
fully refundable,111 meaning that the recipient gets a refund
from the IRS to the extent that the credit amount exceeds tax
liability. For example, if a taxpayer has $2,000 in tax liability and
is entitled to a $10,000 refundable credit, the credit will cut the
taxpayer’s tax bill to zero, and the taxpayer will get $8,000 from
the IRS. To calculate her annual EITC, each taxpayer begins with
her “earned income” below a “ceiling amount” and multiplies it by
her “credit percentage.”112 The credit phases out for taxpayers
whose adjusted gross income exceeds a set amount.113 Above that
amount, a taxpayer must reduce the otherwise available credit by
the “phaseout percentage.”114
While traditional welfare has declined in terms of outlays
in recent history, the EITC has continued to grow. It expanded
under both Republican and Democratic presidential
administrations, in eras of partisan gridlock, under Democratic
and Republican Congressional control, across business cycles,
and amidst changing public attitudes about welfare.115
The EITC began during President Richard Nixon’s
administration. Economists, such as Milton Friedman, advocated
for a “negative income tax” which would create additional work
incentives for low-wage individuals. Through this period, the credit
came to become the government’s largest antipoverty program
“responsible for about 60 [percent] of the [downward] shift from the
mid-1980’s to 2011.”116
Then in 2015, a Republican Congress worked with the
Obama administration to overcome their general reputation for
lack of policy consensus to make those expansions of the antipoverty tax credits permanent.117 This bipartisan step, along
Sorensen, Tax Relief for Low-Income Fathers Who Pay Child Support, in 90 NAT’L TAX
ASS’N, PROC. CONF. 260 (1997); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration
of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867(2005).
110 See generally I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
111 I.R.C. § 32 is part of subpart C of part iv of subchapter A of Chapter 1 of the
Code, entitled “Refundable Credits.” Refundability arises from the lack of statutory
limitation of the credit to tax liability. Id.; see also BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 37.1 (3d ed. 2000).
112 I.R.C. § 32(a)(1)–(2), 32(j).
113 Id. § 32(a)(2)(B).
114 Id. § 32(a)(2).
115 A number of sources have discussed the history of the EITC. The most
detailed I have seen is in found the most detailed account in Christopher Howard’s, The
Hidden Welfare State, from which the following discussion will draw. CHRISTOPHER
HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE (1997).
116 David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality: What Changes in the Tax
System Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593, 634 (2013).
117 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
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with similar moves regarding the Child Tax Credit
“strengthen[ed] the credits’ anti-poverty impact by about 20
percent.”118 This legislation benefitted approximately 50 million
Americans, including 25 million children.119 Most recently,
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan included the EITC as part of
his “A Better Way” legislative blueprint.120
Applicable for years after 1997, the Child Tax Credit
costs the federal government roughly the same amount as the
EITC.121 This program provides a tax credit for each “qualifying
child” of a taxpayer equal to $1,000 per child.122 It phases out
above certain threshold incomes and is not available at all above
a series of higher thresholds.123 The benefit reaches higher
income levels than the EITC and is partially refundable for
incomes over $3,000, but only individuals with income are
eligible to receive the credit.124 The Child Tax Credit also has
grown steadily throughout its history. The Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 and the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) temporarily increased the credit from
$500 to $1,000 per child, made it refundable for a larger number
of families, and allowed families that pay the Alternative
Minimum Tax to take the credit.125 The stimulus bill temporarily
lowered the refundability threshold, and the Job Creation Act of
2010 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 together
extended lower threshold, along with the earlier temporary

118 Chuck Marr, Tax Deal Makes Permanent Key Improvements to Working
Families Tax Credits, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/tax-deal-makes-permanent-key-improvements-toworking-family-tax-credits [https://perma.cc/3FNV-5HXK].
119 Id.
120 TASK FORCE ON POVERTY, OPPORTUNITY AND UPWARD MOBILITY, A BETTER
WAY: OUR VISION FOR A MORE CONFIDENT AMERICA: POVERTY, OPPORTUNITY AND
UPWARD MOBILITY 13–14 (2016).
121 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, JCS-1-13 45 (Comm. Print 2013).
122 I.R.C. § 24(a) (2012).
123 Id. § 24(b).
124 Id. § 24(d)(1), (3)–(4). The credit is refundable above $3,000 of income. Below
$3,000 of income, a taxpayer would not have any tax to pay, so would not be able to take
advantage of a nonrefundable credit. Id.
125 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 101, 111 Stat. 788,
796;Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 201, 115 Stat. 38, 45; MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41873,
THE CHILD TAX CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 12 (2016) (“EGTRRA
allowed the child tax credit to offset AMT tax liability for tax years 2002 through 2010”);
Taxation and What is the Child Tax Credit (CTC)?, TAX POL’Y CTR (2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/ctc.cfm [https://perma.cc/
7KU5-UXKF].
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changes, for additional years.126 Those expansions became
permanent as part of the 2015 bipartisan legislation.127
The tax code also includes large federal programs
subsidizing child care, education and health care for poor and
middle-income taxpayers. With the Child Care Credit, taxpayers
may take a nonrefundable credit of between 20 percent and 35
percent of expenses for the care of “qualifying individuals.”128
Congress enacted the Child Care Credit in 1976, after several
decades of offering less generous deductions for employmentrelated childcare expenses.129 After small changes to the benefit
in 1981, Congress has not revised either it or its companion
child-care subsidy, the Dependent Care Credit.130 The tax code
also has two major tax credits for education, the Hope Credit
(now the American Opportunity Credit, a partially refundable
credit) and the Lifetime Learning Credit.131 As with the other
antipoverty tax statutes, the history of both credits has been one
of consistent growth and expansion. Since temporarily replacing
the Hope Credit with the more generous American Opportunity
Credit, Congress has broadened the credit twice.132 In addition,
the Premium Assistance Credit subsidizes the purchase of
certain health insurance plans for low- and middle-income
families.133 Individuals receive the Premium Assistance Credit
based on income and the cost of the health insurance plan.134
The other antipoverty programs in the tax code are
indirect subsidies that provide incentives to private actors to
126 American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1003,
123 Stat. 115, 313; Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298 (also referred to
as simply the Job Creation Act); American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2315.
127 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 101, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015).
128 I.R.C. §§ 21(a)(1)–(2); 129.
129 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 111, at ¶ 37.2; see also Mary L. Heen,
Welfare Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child
Care Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 177 (1995)
(discussing the history and critically analyzing the credit).
130 Heen, supra note 129, at 176–77.
131 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 201, 111 Stat. 788, 799.
For a critical overview of the credits, see generally Kerry A. Ryan, Access Assured:
Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for Higher Education, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2008); Phyllis C. Smith, The Elusive Cap And Gown: The Impact
of Tax Policy on Access to Higher Education for Low-Income Individuals and Families,
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 181 (2008).
132 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298; American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, §§ 101-02, 126 Stat. 2313, 2315–19.
133 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213.
134 I.R.C. § 36B (2012).
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meet the needs of the poor. Congress enacted the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit in 1986 as “efficient mechanism for
encouraging the production of low-income rental housing” and to
consolidate nontax low-income housing programs that,
according to the credit’s legislative history, “failed to guarantee
that affordable housing would be provided to the most needy
low-income individuals.”135 The credit equals a percentage, up to
70 percent, of the amount that a developer spends on a project
involving a long-term commitment to low-income housing.136 The
incentives are larger for projects serving the lowest-income
tenants and projects committed to serving low-income tenants
for the longest periods.137 In the wake of the credit’s enactment,,
Congress and the IRS have made minor changes to the credit,
and it has since become one of the federal government’s largest
affordable-housing programs.138 The smaller New Markets Tax
Credit gives incentives to invest in low-income communities.
This provision provides benefits to “qualified community
development entit[ies]” (CDE) that serve “low-income
communit[ies].”139 The credit equals a certain percentage of a
“qualified equity investment” in the CDE,140 and since its
creation, Congress has expanded or extended this credit several
times.141 The similarly designed Work Opportunity Credit allows
an employer to take a nonrefundable credit of 25 percent or 40
percent of a set amount (usually $6,000) of the first-year wages
paid to certain employees, such as long-term recipients of
various federal assistance programs like SNAP and TANF.142
Congress enacted the Work Opportunity Credit on a temporary
135 STAFF OF JOINT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, JCS-10-87 152 (Comm. Print 1987). For the credit itself,

see I.R.C.§ 42.
136 I.R.C. §§ 42(g)(3)(A), 42(b)(1)(B).
137 Id. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii). For the debate in the legal literature about the
effectiveness of this and other provisions of the credit, see Megan J. Ballard, Profiting
from Poverty: The Competition Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Developers for LowIncome Housing Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 211, 234 (2003); David Philip Cohen,
Improving the Supply of Affordable Housing: The Role of the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 537 (1998); Stephen Malpezzi & Kerry Vandell, Does the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit Increase the Supply of Housing?, 11 J. HOUSING ECON. 360,
370 (2002); Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing
Tax Credit Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998).
138 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOWINCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2015) (detailing the size of other programs).
139 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1), (e)(1).
140 Id. § 45D(a).
141 See, e.g., Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 102, 120
Stat. 2922, 2934;); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 302, 122 Stat. 3765, 3866; American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357,
§§ 221–23, 118 Stat. 1418, 1431–32.
142 I.R.C. § 51. For the inclusion of TANF, see H.R. REP. NO. 106-1033, at 1027 (2000).
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basis in 1996 and has expanded or extended it almost every year
since.143 Finally, the tax code exempts from income tax
organizations “organized and operated” for certain defined
purposes, including poverty relief,144 and taxpayers may deduct
from income tax contributions made to these organizations.145
As the stories of these tax war on poverty provisions
illustrate, Congress and presidential administrations across party
lines have consistently expanded and extended the programs
containing these “war on poverty” provisions. Moreover, this growth
happened while the cash welfare rolls were shrinking. Though the
conventional scholarly wisdom previously discussed holds that the
past four decades have seen welfare-state retrenchment, that is only
part of the story—the tax components of the welfare state have been
growing substantially.
Underlying this article’s proposal to build on the
consequences of this move for low-income individuals’ rights is
the question how could the tax welfare state have expanded so
significantly as the direct-spending one was contracting? Prior
research has discussed this question in some detail, and has
come up with several answers, two of which are particularly
relevant here. First, tax benefits have been able to attract favor
from both major political parties. The EITC history summarized
above highlights the credit’s support from, for example, political
leaders as disparate in views as President Nixon, President
Obama and Speaker Ryan. By way of example, in the 113th
Congress, “219 [r]epresentatives and 37 [s]enators,” almost all
Republican, signed conservative activist Grover Norquist’s
“Taxpayer Protection Pledge.”146 In so doing, they promised “to
oppose changes in tax deductions or credits that increase the net
143 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1201, 110
Stat. 1755, 1768–72. Then, see, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 101, 111 Stat. 788, 796; Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105277, § 1002, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–888; Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763; Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 303, 118 Stat. 1166, 1179; Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,
Pub. L. 109-432, § 102, 120 Stat. 2922, 2934; Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 190; Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
Act, Pub. L. 111-147, § 101, 124 Stat. 71, 74 (2010); Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101, 124 Stat.
3296, 3298; American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
For a discussion of this credit, see generally Francine J. Lipman, Enabling Work for
People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives,
53 AM. U.L. REV. 393 (2003).
144 I.R.C. §§ 501(c), 527–28; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2).
145 I.R.C. § 170(c)(1).
146 Federal Taxpayer Protection Pledge: 113th Congressional List, AM. FOR TAX
REFORM, https://cusdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/113th-Congress-ATF-Pledge.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KU6-QJD4].
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tax burden on Americans.”147 To cut any of the tax antipoverty
programs, those members of Congress would have had to break
that promise. Similarly, in a polarized political environment in
which the House Freedom Caucus struggled to find common
policy ground with the Obama Administration, one of the few
bills to become law in 2015 extended the Child Tax Credit and
the EITC.148
Second, and relatedly, public opinion favors tax benefits
relative to their direct-spending counterparts. A spate of published
studies in the past few years has consistently found that people are
more likely to support tax-embedded social programs than their
non-tax counterparts.149 In another unpublished survey
experiment conducted in June of 2016, Alex Tahk and I again
found this to be true across policy areas, particularly when
comparing direct-spending programs to tax deductions.150
Preference for the tax antipoverty programs may stem in
part from the fact that middle and higher-income taxpayers also
benefit from some of these programs. Four experimental studies
by different research teams, however, have now shown that
when given descriptions of two programs that are otherwise
substantively identical, one tax-embedded and the other not,
respondents regularly favor the tax version.151 As tax and
economics scholars Conor Clarke and Edward Fox have written,
“the public strongly prefers tax expenditures even when the
economic substance of the proposed policies is identical.”152

147 Federal Taxpayer Protection Pledge Questions and Answers, AM. FOR TAX
REFORM (June 1, 2011, 3:22 PM), https://www.atr.org/federal-taxpayer-protectionquestions-answers-a6204 [https://perma.cc/2LQP-FVMR].
148 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 101, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015).
149 Conor Clarke, New Research on the Stubborn Persistence of Tax
Expenditures 150 TAX NOTES 1462 (2016); Conor Clarke & Edward Fox, Note,
Perceptions of Tax Expenditures and Direct Outlays: A Survey Experiment 124 YALE L.J.
1252 (2014); Christopher Faricy & Christopher Ellis, Public Attitudes Toward Social
Spending in the United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax
Expenditures, 36 POL. BEHAV. 53 (2013); Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon Bartels, Public
Opinion, Policy Tools, and the Status Quo: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 68 POL.
RES. Q. 607 (2015); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing
Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax
Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 799 (2005) (finding that participants in a
survey experiment were less likely to view property tax exemptions, as opposed to direct
subsidies, as interfering with volunteer firefighters’ status as volunteers).
150 See generally Alexander M. Tahk & Susannah Tahk, Tax-Embedded
Programs and the Politics of Public Policy, (June 2016) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
151 See Clarke, supra note 149; Clarke & Fox, supra note 149; Faricy & Ellis,
supra note 149; Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 149.
152 Clarke & Fox, supra note 149, at 1252.

898

B.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

Tax Rights for the Poor

The use of tax law to fight poverty has consequences for
low-income individuals’ rights. This section will explore these
consequences, both as a matter of theory and as a matter of
practice. The picture that emerges shows a potentially robust
regime grounded in ideas of equally situated citizens all subject
to the same social contract. This rights landscape contrasts with
the narrative about the decline of welfare rights.
1. Theoretical Foundations
Tax benefits come with rights. These rights accrue to poor
recipients of tax benefits much as they do to wealthy individuals or
businesses who obtain subsidies through the tax code—from a
rights perspective, tax law situates a poor taxpayer taking the
EITC identically to a partner in a hedge fund, or to the hedge fund
itself. These rights arise from participating in the tax system.
Tax rights for all rest on twin theoretical foundations: the
meaning of the social contract and the meaning of private
property. To first discuss the social contract, subjecting oneself to a
country’s taxing power and paying the resulting taxes serves as
consideration in a social contract.153 By giving up unfettered
domain over one’s property, a U.S. citizen or resident relinquishes
something valuable to them. Doing so triggers the reciprocal
obligations on the part of the taxing government.154
The idea that status as a taxpayer creates a contractual
stake in a society appears commonly in public discourse. Anyone
who “as a taxpayer” has ever complained about the government
has appealed to this intuition. The question then becomes, what
153 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 36 (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (1762).
154 Lucy Madison, Fact-checking Romney’s “47 percent” comment, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fact-checking-romneys-47-percentcomment [https://perma.cc/8XUE-7L6K]; Subjecting oneself to the taxing power not only
represents an abstract surrender of liberty, but has concrete effects on daily life. This is
true whether the citizen pays net income taxes or not. For example, even a member of
the infamous “47 [percent]” who, in 2012, did not pay net income taxes in that year
shaped her behavior subject to the dictates of the code imposing the income tax law. As
a practical matter, U.S. workers pay net payroll tax every year, and perhaps more
importantly, whether someone has net tax liability changes from year to year, and
different people owe zero in different years. See Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor:
Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 415 (2003) (documenting
income volatility and frequent movement, especially by low-income taxpayers, through
different provisions and brackets). Even if some citizens never paid net income tax,
however, by subjecting themselves to the taxing power, they would still be giving up
something valuable and altering their daily lives accordingly.
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must the government provide in return? Political philosophers
for centuries have been trying to answer that question. Different
stakeholders have different expectations. Protecting the rights
of the individual, however, is at least part of the government’s
responsibility. As a result, under the social contract theory, the
answer to “why does a citizen have rights?” becomes “because the
government has agreed to provide them in exchange for payment
of taxes.” That answer fundamentally links taxpayer status and
rights claims. The taxpayer signs the social contract again every
year when she fills out her tax return. This vision of social
citizenship stresses the “participation” piece of what equal-dignity
citizenship theorist Kenneth Karst has called “two related and
overlapping values: participation and responsibility.”155 For him,
“[t]o be a citizen is not merely to be a consumer of rights, but to be
responsible to other members of the community.”156 The
contribution made through the tax system heeds constitutional law
scholar Nan Hunter’s call for more “elaboration of the
responsibility branch” in that vision.157
Second, and related, the existence of private property
implicates tax rights. The benefits obtained through the U.S.
system for this point in time come as part of tax refunds. All
taxpayers have property rights in those tax refunds. The concept
of a refund is that the government is returning to the taxpayer
money he earned. Federal law allows the IRS to withhold taxes,
but can only keep them to the extent that the taxpayer legally
owed them, and thus a taxpayer has at least some property
interest in his refund. In his article, A New New Property,
Professor Super wrote that,
Property law is the guardian of the line between individual and state.
It is the foundation of individual autonomy and independence.
Individuals lacking property rights are left dependent on the state,
and “[d]ependence creates a vicious circle of dependence.” Individuals
whose interests lack the protection of property law lose their ability to
resist intrusive, often arbitrary government regulation and may even
become abettors of the state’s power over them158

Giving low-income individuals rights through tax
refunds would collapse this distinction between dependent
155 Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1977).
156 Id.
157 Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1963 (2011) (citing THOMAS JANOSKI, CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL
SOCIETY 53 (1998)).
158 David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1794 (2013)
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting and citing Reich, supra note 45, at
733, 737, 749, 751, 758).
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government beneficiaries with no property rights and
autonomous citizens with property rights. People who receive
their benefits as part of their refunds acquire all the property
rights that otherwise attach to those refunds. One does not need
a particularly expansive Reichian view of new property for
property rights to extend to tax refunds. In fact, the few tax cases
to consider the question simply assume that they do.159
Both social-contract theory and the concept of private
property would provide sufficient bases for any citizen subject to
the taxing power to make rights claims. Business, wealthy, and
middle-income taxpayers in fact do this all the time. Plugging
“rights” into a legal search engine of tax cases yields thousands
of cases in which taxpayers have asserted various rights, some
grounded in the Constitution, others in legislation, still others
in individual moral intuition. Taxpayers presumably make
millions more in administrative disputes both formal and
informal every tax year.
As a practical matter, taxpayers with access to greater
resources appear to make more of these arguments than
taxpayers with fewer resources at their disposal. When
individuals continuously assert rights, however, those rights
become stronger and are bolstered by favorable court and agencylevel decisions. As a result, taxpayers with fewer resources could
be able to take advantage of the reinvigorated rights. To give a
concrete example, business taxpayers have been maintaining their
rights to privacy before the IRS for 74 years.160 If a poor taxpayer
now wants to argue for her right to privacy, she may base her
position in the precedents that her wealthier counterparts have put
into place. Conversely, the law she establishes will in turn apply to
them, so it may be safe to assume that many wealthy individuals
would support her claim.161
To give another, in Facebook v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
high-resource taxpayer Facebook, represented by one of the
largest law firms in the United States, is suing the IRS over
whether the company has a right to appear before the IRS’s
159 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Obama, 6 F. Supp. 3d 31, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[a]ssuming,
arguendo, that the plaintiff has a legitimate claim of entitlement to and protected
property interest in the 2005 tax refund”); Games v. Cavazos, 737 F. Supp. 1368, 1377
(D. Del. 1990) (“A taxpayer has a property interest in his tax refund sufficient to entitle
him to the protections of procedural due process before he is deprived of his refund.”).
The interesting question here, which I will return to later in the article, is whether the
same property rights accompany the refundable portion of a refundable credit as
accompany the rest of the refund. As I will discuss, courts have not considered the
refundable-portion question directly.
160 See Sellmayer Packing v. Comm’r, 146 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1944).
161 Another example of this concerns refundable credits.
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Office of Appeals.162 At issue in the case, among other things, is
whether the 2015 Taxpayer Bill of Rights legislation, discussed
below, creates a statutory right to appeal an IRS decision.163 The
breadth and substance of the 2015 legislation is an issue that
applies to low-income taxpayers as well as to taxpayer giants
like Facebook. The extent to which Facebook’s suit creates
taxpayer-friendly precedent on this point, low-income taxpayers
will be able to rely on it.
Similarly, strengthening taxpayer rights may call forth
unusual and broad coalitions of support, as tax-benefits issues
so often do. For one, the rights claims that poor beneficiaries
make in the context of the tax system may resonate with and
affect not just wealthy taxpayers, but also could affect ordinary
taxpayers. For example, if the government were to argue that a
taxpayer does not have a property interest in his refund, the
approximately 100 million taxpayers who received refunds in
2015 might object, saying something along the lines of, “Wait,
my tax refund isn’t mine?”
Taxpayer rights claims may even cross traditional party
lines. Calls for stronger taxpayer rights often come from the right,
even from its fringes in the tax protestor community,164 but demands
for more robust rights in government benefits frequently emerge
from the left, as was true of the welfare rights movement. Privateproperty enthusiasts and low-income community organizers can
find common ground in advocating that the government should do
more to protect taxpayer rights. Part of this overlap may stem from
the fact that favoring rights for those who participate in the tax
system is consistent with social and economic rights but favoring
those rights does not require parties to embrace those rights. As
described in detail earlier, part of what doomed the War on Poverty
litigation strategy was the extent to which it brought in the right to
subsistence.165 Most decisionmakers in that period never agreed,
however, that the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to
subsistence. That remains a contested issue, yet taxpayer rights do
not implicate social and economic rights to the extent that welfare
rights did. Fighting for taxpayer rights does not undermine the
162 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive or Mandamus-Like Relief,
Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490-LB
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017).
163 Facebook’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 3:17-cv at 10, Case
No. 3:17-cv-06490-LB (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Sather, 3. F. App’x 725 (10th Cir. 2001); Grell v.
Obama, Misc. No. 15–51 (JRT/BRT), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144049 (D. Minn. Oct. 21,
2015); Lenz v. Brellenthin, No. 14-CV-481-JPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101696 (E.D. Wis.
July 25, 2014).
165 DAVIS, supra note 16, at 132.
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battle for social and economic rights and may in fact assist in
it.166
Observing the widespread potential support for taxpayer
rights highlights the fact that the tax-based welfare state does
not operate along two tiers. In fact, it presents a one-tiered
vision of equal citizenship. The concern about a welfare state
that divides beneficiaries into two groups, one deserving of
rights and benefits and the other less so, does not apply as
cleanly to the tax system. As discussed above, neither the socialcontract nor the private-property foundations of taxpayer rights
distinguish among different classes of signatories to the social
contract or property holders. Of the historical origins of the twotiered welfare state, T.H. Marshall wrote, that direct cash
assistance traditionally “treated the claims of the poor not as an
integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to
them—as claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased
to be citizens in any true sense of the word.”167 Awarding benefits
by virtue of the poor recipient’s taxpayer status does the
opposite—tying the benefits directly to the process by which he
asserts his citizenship stake in U.S. society.
The single tier of the tax-based welfare state plays itself out
practically. As mentioned above, over a hundred million taxpayers
filed for and received refunds in 2015.168 All of them filled out one
of a few forms and faced the same set of administrative and
legislative procedures for resolving disputes. In fact, data suggest
that the benefits that taxpayers take vary substantially from year
to year. For example, the National Taxpayer Advocate found that
one-third of EITC claimants turn over from year to year.169 A
taxpayer might take the EITC one year, the home-office deduction
the next, and then both the following year. Putting aside abstract
notions about equal human dignity, the administrative cost of

166 Different taxpayer rights claims may relate differently to ideas about social
and economic rights. I am not sure that, for instance the taxpayer right to privacy has
much to do with social and economic rights, although it does help people who are deriving
subsistence in part from their tax benefits. On the other hand, a creative advocate might
be able to use the right to a fair and just tax system, to support some vision of social and
economic rights.
167 Tani, supra note 18, at 321 (quoting T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social
Class (1949), reprinted in T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT 30 (1964)).
168 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration: Results of the 2015 Tax
Filing Season, TREASURY (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/
2015reports/201540080fr.html [https://perma.cc/U7RV-BBQC].
169 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 248–49
(2015), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Vol
ume1.pdf.
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having a different rights framework applied each year to a
particular person would be prohibitive.
One example of the way that this equal-citizenship vision
has exhibited itself concretely is in the relative lack of stigma in
applying for tax benefits. Scholars (myself included) have
discussed this in other work.170 While many beneficiaries report
that applying for TANF, food stamps and other direct-spending
benefits specifically humiliates low-income individuals, the
process of applying for a tax refund treats all applicants across
income groups in the same way.171 Taxpayers across races, social
classes, and genders heavily rely on tax preparers, either in
person or as software.172 An extensive literature has accurately
documented problems with the private return-preparer
industry, but no research has described it as stigmatizing.173 In
fact, many taxpayers who are eligible for the antipoverty tax
programs do not even realize that they are until showing up at
H & R Block or loading TurboTax.174 Indeed, many of these
individuals may not even know that the credits for which they
qualify have income ceilings.
2. Procedural Due Process for Tax Rights
As described above in Mathews, the Supreme Court
rejected the need for a pre-termination hearing in cases related
to the denial of federal Social Security disability benefits.175 It
applied a three-factor test for satisfying procedural due process
Tahk, supra note 4, at 828; see also Greene, supra note 109, at 535.
Tahk, supra note 4, at 828.
172 John A. Koskinen, Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., Written Testimony
Before the Senate Finance Comm. on Regulation of Tax Return Preparers 1 (Apr. 8,
2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koskinen%20Testimony.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3CE5-6MYW] (“Each year, paid preparers are called upon by taxpayers to
complete about 80 million returns, or about 56 percent of the total individual income tax
returns filed, while another 34 percent of taxpayers use tax preparation software, for a
total of 90 percent who seek some form of assistance.”).
173 See, e.g., Alex H. Levy, Believing in Life After Loving: IRS Regulation of Tax
Preparers, 17 FLA. TAX. REV. 437, 440 (2015); Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas,
Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 151, 155 (2017); see also GAO, PAID
TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS (2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662356.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2PM-KM9B]; TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE
OF UNCONTROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS (2008), https://
www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200840171fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CD6C-FZQP]; CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RIDDLED RETURNS: HOW
ERRORS AND FRAUD BY PAID TAX PREPARERS PUT CONSUMERS AT RISK AND WHAT
STATES CAN DO 1 (2014), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-riddledreturns.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MWT-KTRC].
174 Tahk, supra note 3, at 93–95 (borrowing a phrase from social welfare
administration and calling this the “no wrong door” approach to social policy).
175 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976).
170

171
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in the benefits context: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”176 These prongs apply to all process—including both the
hearings and the notice—that the government must provide in
denying or terminating a property interest.177
While it does not appear that Mathews has been specifically
applied to tax refunds, its analysis seems to suggest that denying tax
benefits may require a pre-termination hearing. First, as described
in the previous Part, the private interest that taxpayers have in their
refund is probably relatively substantial.178 Tax refunds represent
money that the government withheld, possibly above the taxpayer’s
legal obligation to pay.179 The statute allows the government to
withhold for reasons of administrative convenience but does not
entitle the government to hold property to which it has no legal right
for an indefinite period. Colloquially, tax practitioners often refer to
the refund as “interest-free loans to the . . . government.”180 As a
result, the refund is, for the purposes of property law, more like the
salary the taxpayer earned in the first place than like a benefit that
the government later decided to bestow.
The more interesting theoretical question concerns the
due-process protections required for the portion of the refund
attributable to the refundable component of refundable credits.
Is this more like the government paying out Social Security
disability benefits or is it more similar to the government
returning borrowed property? Advocates for either answer could
make good arguments. Relevant law might include the IRS’s
mixed but taxpayer-friendly guidance on whether the refunds
are taxable income and case law from bankruptcy court detailing
whether refunds constitute property of the estate that creditors
can seize.181 The IRS otherwise takes the position that directlyId. at 335.
See id.; see also Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 767–68 (2d Cir. 1986).
178 See supra Section B.1.
179 Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-68, ch. 120, sec. 2(a),
§§ 1621–1622, 57 Stat. 126, 126–35.
180 Megan McArdle, Happy Tax Day. Now Stop Making Interest-Free Loans to
the US Government, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 14, 2013), https://www.thedailybeast.com/happytax-day-now-stop-making-interest-free-loans-to-the-us-government [https://perma.cc/
8T64-ABQY].
181 I have treated the former in an earlier article in which I concluded that the
refundable portions are probably not taxable income. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 96–98.
176

177
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administered government benefits are taxable income unless
specifically excluded by statute or guidance.182 If the refundable
piece in that context was more like a return of borrowed property
than a newly acquired government benefit, it suggests that the
refundable piece entitles the recipient to the same due-process
protections as the rest of the refund does. This is an example of
another circumstance in which precedent concerning rights
developed through cases with high-income taxpayers could
affect their low-income counterparts. The taxpayers who take
the largest individual refundable credits are probably companies
taking hundreds of millions of dollars in refundable energy
credits. If the IRS ever takes the position that refundable credits
are taxable government subsidies, advocates for the rich and
poor will presumably weigh in on this topic.
Bankruptcy courts have seen the emerging issue of whether
the child tax credit is property of the estate in Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings. Some courts have held that both the
refundable and nonrefundable portions are property of the
estate.183 Others have distinguished the refundable portion,
holding it exempt as a public assistance benefit.184 Still others have
held the entire credit is exempt as a public assistance benefit.185 As
a result, neither the IRS’s guidance nor bankruptcy court
precedent provide a clear answer about the nature of the property
interest in the refundable credits. Consequently, it remains to be
seen how a court would rule on this question. At a minimum, the
refundable portion would likely have the same property-interest
status as the disability benefits in Mathews, or as other
government benefits with clear statutory eligibility guidelines.186
182 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 111, at ¶ 16.4 (citing Deason v. Comm’r, 590
F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1979)).
183 See In re Law, 336 B.R. 780, 783 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (holding that neither
is exempt from creditors because both are “contingent interests” under bankruptcy law.
184 See In re Hardy, 787 F.3d 1189, 1191–93 (8th Cir. 2015) (chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding); In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 783, 792 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2014); In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523,
527–28 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). Relevant to these courts is what they see as Congressional
intent to designate the refundable portion a “public assistance benefit.”
185 See In re Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523, 527–28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). The court
rested its holding on construing the term “public assistance benefit” broadly for
bankruptcy purposes and on the fact that that the phase-out is a means test, and, in the
court’s view, it should not apply an additional means test in bankruptcy proceedings.
186 See, e.g., Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting) (“It is well established that recipients of statutory entitlements such as Social
Security disability benefits have a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause . . . .”). Courts have found that statutes with “defined eligibility criteria” create
the kind of entitlements that in turn give rise to property rights. See Kapps v. Wing, 404
F.3d 105, 113 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“In determining whether a given benefits regime creates
a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, we look to the statutes and
regulations . . . . Where those statutes or regulations ‘meaningfully channel[ ] official
discretion by mandating a defined administrative outcome,’ a property interest will be
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As for the second Mathews prong, the chance of erroneous
deprivation depends on the particular IRS process the taxpayer
faced. In an audit, a taxpayer normally receives a refund and the
IRS subsequently institutes proceedings to get the disputed
portion back. The IRS cannot initiate a collections action until it
has gone through a process called “collection due process”
(CDP).187 While low-income taxpayer assistance clinicians have
reasonably criticized CDP hearings as poorly designed and
overly burdensome for poor taxpayers, CDP actually includes a
hearing that takes place before the IRS collects anything. As
such, CDP carries with it a relatively low risk of erroneous
deprivation, at least in comparison to the procedures concerning
other government benefits. As will also be discussed below,
however, the IRS does not always follow standard audit
procedures in the case of low-income taxpayers. Not doing so
might create a risk of erroneous deprivation, tipping the scales
in the Mathews test.
Finally, and with regard to the third prong, the IRS deals
with many more people than any traditional antipoverty agency.
Any requirement the IRS must follow applies not just to poor
taxpayers but to all taxpayers. As a result, the government may
be able to argue in any tax case that the cost of additional
procedure is substantial. On the other hand, a creative taxpayer
advocate might be able to craft a remedy that would be relatively
low-cost to the government. Nonetheless, balancing the three
prongs, while the first is uncertain, the second two seem toto
weigh in the favor of the government in most circumstances.

found to exist.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Sealed v. Sealed, 332
F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003))); Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke, 930 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir.
1991). Taxpayers who have filed for the refundable portion of tax credits might be more
like applicants for benefits than current beneficiaries facing termination. The Supreme
Court has reserved judgment on the point, but every circuit to rule on the question has
agreed that applicants for benefits should get the same due process protections as
recipients facing termination. See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986); Walters
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985) (declining to rule on
the issue); Kapps 404 F.3d at 115; Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 557–59 (6th Cir. 2004);
Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998); Mallette v.
Arlington Cty. Emps.’ Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 637–40 (4th Cir. 1996);
Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1304–05 (6th Cir. 1996); Ward v. Downtown Dev. Auth.,
786 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1986); Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132–
33 (8th Cir. 1984); Kelly v. Railroad Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489–90 (3d Cir. 1980);
Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121–22 (9th Cir. 1979).
187 I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2012); see also Collection Appeal Rights, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1660.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A8WK533]; Collection Due Process (CDP), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last updated Apr. 13,
2018), https://www.irs.gov/compliance/appeals/collection-due-process-cdp [https://perma.cc/
QRN6-X5F3].
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3. Legislative and Administrative Protection of Tax
Rights
The tax code includes a number of provisions that protect
taxpayer rights. As the National Taxpayer Advocate wrote in
2013, “The good news on this front is that the Internal Revenue
Code provides dozens of taxpayer rights. Real rights. Substantive
rights.”188 In the past several decades, Congress has strengthened
these rights through bills known as Taxpayer Bills of Rights, as
well as through legislation called the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998.189 Toward this end the IRS consolidated these
and other pre-existing statutory provisions in 2014 into a ten-right
agency-level “Taxpayer Bill of Rights.”190 In late 2015, Congress
codified this language and required the IRS Commissioner to
ensure that all staff are familiar with and work to protect these ten
rights.191 Scholars and advocates for the poor have yet to explore
the consequences.
Most recently, in late 2014, the IRS consolidated all of
these legislative provisions, plus pre-existing sections of the tax
code, into a “Taxpayer Bill of Rights,” a list of ten rights
“embracing a set of fundamental principles” to “guide all policies,
practices and procedures.”192 Congress then incorporated these
ten rights into the tax code in late 2015, along with a statutory
188 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM: A
TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE TAX ADMINISTRATION,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO RAISE TAXPAYER AND EMPLOYEE AWARENESS OF TAXPAYER
RIGHTS 1 (2013) [hereinafter TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM],
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-annual-report/downloads/Toward-a-More-PerfectTax-System-A-Taxpayer-Bill-of-Rights-as-a-Framework-for-Effective-Tax-Administration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MFZ-GPZX].
189 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102
Stat. 3342, 3730–52 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.);
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996); Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. For a
summary of the bill and its legislative history, see generally Lawrence B. Gibbs,
Taxpayer Bill of Rights, in WILLIAM & MARY ANNUAL TAX CONFERENCE PAPER 199
(1989); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom? 15 FLA. TAX. REV.
1, 36–38 (2013). For summary and analysis of the bill, see generally Elliot H. Hajan, A
Kinder, Gentler IRS, 21 L.A. LAW. 28 (1998); Wm. Brian Henning, Comment: Reforming
the IRS: The Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 405 (1999).
190 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 1, YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER:
TAXPAYER
BILL
OF
RIGHTS
(2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JX9W-DGWY] [hereinafter TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS]; see also IRS
Adopts “Taxpayer Bill Of Rights;” 10 Provisions To Be Highlighted On IRS.Gov, In
Publication 1, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 10, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/
newsroom/irs-adopts-taxpayer-bill-of-rights-10-provisions-to-be-highlighted-on-irsgovin-publication-1 [https://perma.cc/J8F2-5JW2].
191 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 401, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015).
192 Bartmann, supra note 1, at 598.
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requirement that “the Commissioner shall ensure that
employees of the Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and
act in accord with taxpayer rights as afforded by other provisions
of this title, including [the ten rights].”193
The ten taxpayer rights described in the 2014–2015
Taxpayer Bill of Rights build on dozens of tax code provisions.
The first is the “right to be informed,” under which “[t]axpayers
have the right to know what they need to do to comply with the
tax laws.”194 As a result, taxpayers are “entitled to clear
explanations of the laws and IRS procedures in all tax forms,
instructions, publications, notices, and correspondence” and have
“the right to be informed of IRS decisions about their tax accounts
and to receive clear explanations of the outcomes.”195 The second
right is the “[r]ight to [q]uality [s]ervice.”196 Taxpayers have “the
right to receive prompt, courteous, and professional assistance in
their dealings with the IRS, to be spoken to in a way they can
easily understand, to receive clear and easily understandable
communications from the IRS, and to speak to a supervisor
about inadequate service.”197 The third right is the “[r]ight to

Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 2015, H.R. 1058, 114th Cong. § 2(a).
TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190; Taxpayer Bill of Rights,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/
W82K-YLU7].
195 Id. Each of the provisions of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights incorporates several
statutory rights provisions. For the list of these provisions, as cited individually here,
see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 52. (This first right
incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6402(l) (requiring the IRS to explain reasons for disallowing
refunds); 6751 (requiring the IRS to explain penalty calculations); 7521 (requiring the
IRS to explain to audited taxpayers the audit and collection processes); and 7522
(specifying the “[c]ontent of tax due notice, deficiency notice, and other notices”); Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act (RRA) Sections 3501 (requiring the IRS
to explain “joint and several liability” to potentially affected taxpayers); 3503 (requiring
the IRS to include in its annual “Publication 1 the criteria and procedures for selecting
taxpayers for examination”); and 3504 (requiring the IRS to include “[e]xplanations of
examination and collection processes” with any first letter of proposed deficiency); and
finally RRA Section 3506 and Treasury Regulation Section 301.6159-1(h) (requiring the
IRS to issue an “[a]nnual statement of [any] installment agreement initial balance,
payments made during the year, and remaining balance at year-end”)).
196 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 52–53.(This right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6212
(requiring any IRS “[n]otice of deficiency to include notice of the taxpayer’s right to
contact a local office of the Taxpayer Advocate”); 6304 (giving taxpayers the right to “fair
collection practices.”); 7526 (providing for “[l]ow income taxpayer clinics”); 7803(c)
(creating and empowering the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate); and 7811 (setting forth
procedures for “[t]axpayer assistance orders” for taxpayers in need for administrative
help); as well as RRA Sections 3705 (requiring IRS correspondence to include the “name,
phone number, and unique identifying number of an IRS employee that the taxpayer
may contact with respect to that correspondence”); and RRA Section 3709 (requiring the
IRS to list local telephone numbers and addresses in the area telephone book)).
197 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190.
193

194
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[p]ay [n]o [m]ore than the [c]orrect [a]mount of [t]ax” due198
which entails “the right to pay only the amount of tax legally
due, including interest and penalties, and to have the IRS apply
all tax payments properly.”199
The fourth right is “[t]he [r]ight to [c]hallenge the IRS’s
[p]osition and [b]e [h]eard”200 This procedurally-oriented right
consists of “the right to raise objections and provide additional
documentation in response to formal IRS actions or proposed
actions, to expect that the IRS will consider their timely objections
and documentation promptly and fairly, and to receive a response
if the IRS does not agree with their position.”201 Related is the fifth
right, “[t]he [r]ight to [a]ppeal an IRS [d]ecision in an [i]ndependent
[f]orum.”202 This right specifies that “[t]axpayers are entitled to a
fair and impartial administrative appeal of most IRS decisions,
including many penalties, and have the right to receive a written
response regarding the [IRS’s] Office of Appeals’ decision.”203
Further “[t]axpayers generally have the right to take their cases to
court.”204 Then, once the taxpayer has exhausted her procedural
rights, she has right six, “[t]he [r]ight to [f]inality.”205
198 Id.; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 53 (This
right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6402 (setting forth administrative procedures for
refund claims); 6404 (providing, among other things, that “[t]he Secretary [of the
Treasury] may abate tax where excessive in amount, barred by the statute of limitations,
or erroneously or illegally assessed” and allowing for certain other powers); 7122
(allowing taxpayers with ongoing disputes to make offers in compromise); and 7524
(requiring the IRS to issue annual notices of tax delinquency where relevant); and RRA
Section 3506 and Treasury Regulation Section 301.6159-1(h)).
199 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190.
200 Id.; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 53 (This
right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6213(b) (giving the IRS limited “[m]athematical and
clerical error summary assessment” authority that abridges standard dispute
procedures); and Sections 6320 and 6330 (setting forth procedures for “[c]ollection due
process hearings”)).
201 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190.
202 Id.; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 53–54 (This
right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6159(e) (providing for “[i]ndependent administrative
review of terminations of installment agreements”); 6212 and 6213 (setting forth
procedures for taxpayers to petition to the U.S. Tax Court); 6320 and 6330; 7122(e)
(requiring “[i]ndependent administrative review and appeal of any rejection of a
proposed offer in compromise or an installment agreement”); 7123 (providing for “dispute
resolution procedures, including early referral, mediation, and arbitration” within the
IRS’s Appeals division); 7422 (setting forth procedures by which taxpayers can sue for
refunds in federal court); 7428 and 7476 through 7479 (providing for declaratory
judgments); and 7429 (setting forth procedures for “review[s] of jeopardy levy or
assessment”); and RRA Section 1001(a)(4) (concerning impartiality of appeals)).
203 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190.
204 Id.
205 Id.; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 54 (This
right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6213; 6501 (setting forth statute of “[l]imitations on
assessment and collection”); 6502 (setting forth the statute of “limitations on collection
after assessment”); 6511 (also setting forth a statute of limitations, this time on “claim[s]
for credit or refund”); 7121 (providing for “closing agreements” after certain
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Rights seven and eight concern privacy and confidentiality.
“The [r]ight to [p]rivacy” (to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures)” means that a taxpayer has “the right to expect that
any IRS inquiry, examination, or enforcement action will comply
with the law and be no more intrusive than necessary, and will
respect all due process rights, including search and seizure
protections and will provide, where applicable, a collection due
process hearing”206 Under the “right to confidentiality” taxpayers
“have the right to expect that any information they provide to the
IRS will not be disclosed unless authorized by the taxpayer or by
law.”207 Additionally, taxpayers “have the right to expect
appropriate action will be taken against employees, return
preparers, and others who wrongfully use or disclose taxpayer
return information.”208
The ninth right is the alliterative “[r]ight to [r]etain
[r]epresentation,” which encompasses “the right to retain an
authorized representative of their choice to represent them in their
dealings with the IRS,” including “the right to seek assistance from
a Low Income Taxpayer Clinic if they cannot afford
representation.”209 Then, the final, and perhaps most broadly
worded right is, “the [r]ight to a [f]air and [j]ust [t]ax [s]ystem.”210
administrative processes); 7122; 7481 (concerning the “[f]inality of U.S. Tax Court
decision[s]”); and 7605(b) (restricting audits) (emphasis added)).
206 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 54. (This right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6320 and
6330; 6331 (providing “[l]evy and distraint rules”); 6334 (exempting certain property
from levy); 6335 (putting conditions on sale of seized property); and 6340 (setting forth
procedures for accounting of “proceeds of sale of property”); and RRA Section 3421
(specifying an administrative approval process for “liens, levies, and seizures.”)).
207 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190.
208 Id.; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 54–55
(This right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6103 (providing for “[c]onfidentiality of taxpayer
returns and tax return information”); 6713 and 7216 (imposing “[c]ivil and criminal
penalties for disclosure or use of tax return information by a tax return preparer”); 7525
(setting forth the “[c]onfidentiality privilege for federally authorized tax practitioners”);
7602(c) (detailing rules for the IRS’s third party contacts); and 7803(c)(4)(A)(iv) (putting
in place requirements for the “discretion of [a] local [T]axpayer [A]dvocate” about
whether to “disclose to the IRS the fact that taxpayer has contacted the [office]”)).
209 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 55. (This right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 7430
(“awarding of attorneys’ fees and administrative/litigation costs” in certain proceedings);
7521(b)(2) (specifying that “[a]n IRS officer or employee cannot require the taxpayer to
attend an interview where represented by a power of attorney, unless pursuant to a
summons”); 7521(c) (setting forth additional power of attorney rules); and 7526).
210 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190; see TOWARD A MORE PERFECT
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 55. (This right incorporates I.R.C. Sections 6159
(providing for installment agreements generally); 6404; 6511(h) (relevant here, allowing
“[t]olling of statute of limitations for refund claims during periods of taxpayer’s financial
disability due to a medically determinable impairment”); 6651 (allowing for penalty
abatement regarding failure to file/failure to pay penalties); 6656 (allowing for penalty
abatement regarding failure to deposit penalty); 6694 (allowing for penalty abatement
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RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE TAX WAR ON POVERTY

Recognizing that all recipients of tax benefits have the
aforementioned rights has the potential to help the government to
better protect those rights. While Congress has certainly been active
in passing taxpayer-rights legislation, in practice, safeguarding and
strengthening these rights depends on the IRS, on taxpayers, and
on taxpayers’ advocates. Acknowledging taxpayer rights is the first
step to mobilizing all of the relevant parties.
The IRS has administered large-scale antipoverty
subsidies for fewer than three decades, during which it has come
under regular funding assault. As the longtime National
Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson—herself a former lawyer in a
low-income taxpayer assistance clinic—writes annually in her
report to Congress, securing the rights of poor taxpayers
presents particular challenges. As a result, the agency, along
with taxpayers and their representatives, have work to do to
protect these rights. In her 2016 report to Congress, issued in
2017, she argued that, “[i]ncorporating [t]axpayer [r]ights into
[t]axpayer [a]dministration” should be an agency priority.211 She
wrote that, “[a] requirement for success appears to be making
the TBOR part of the IRS’s culture and a general way of doing
things,” and she suggested a number of ways for the agency to
make these rights real.212
As her report advises, a focus on the fact that these rights
do exist, and that these rights are substantial, would open up paths
to build the rights of low-income taxpayers.213 This article identifies
two potential paths: enshrining rights through individual taxpayer
disputes, and manipulating institutional design to take better
advantage of the taxpayer-rights framework. The law-and-society
literature finds that legal rights derive much of their power when
affected individuals mobilize their rights.214 The rest of this article
with regard to return preparer penalties); 7122; 7803 (setting up the Office of the
Taxpayer Advocate); 7811).
211 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 3 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (2016),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-ARC/ARC16_Volume3.pdf.
212 Id. at 29.
213 I focus here on the federal government, but states also administer
antipoverty programs through their tax codes. As a result, similar rights opportunities
presumably exist at the state level.
214 See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social
Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil
Rights, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 12 (2005); Catherine Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen,
The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the
Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2007); Calvin Morrill et. al.,
Legal Mobilization in Schools: The Paradox of Rights and Race Among Youth, 44 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 651, 654 (2010).
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suggests a few potential paths by which low-income taxpayers and
their advocates might do so.
A.

Taxpayer Rights in Individual Disputes

During the 1960s War on Poverty, as described above,
poverty lawyers established welfare rights, in large part through
representing government beneficiaries in individual disputes with
welfare agencies. Those disputes gave rise to the landmark cases
like King and Goldberg.215 While movement leaders constantly
struggled to balance the interests of individual recipients with
system-wide advocacy, individual cases became major vehicles for
fighting welfare-rights battles. The case-based model provides an
example for traditional poverty lawyers and low-income taxpayer
representatives alike looking to do the same with poor taxpayers’
rights. These advocates have the same due process rights at their
disposal, along with the legislative rights framework described
above. Taken together, those two sets of rights combine provide a
larger and more powerful set of rights tools than the War on
Poverty lawyers had at their disposal decades ago. In addition,
unlike the prohibitions on systemic advocacy in the case of postwelfare reform cash assistance, no specific legislation prohibits
advocates from conducting systemic advocacy through tax cases.
This article makes a few suggestions, but overall, by focusing on
taxpayer rights, creative and experienced advocates can likely
identify many more promising avenues to pursue and arguments
to make to protect taxpayer rights.
To take one example, certain audit procedures that apply
to the poor may raise procedural due process issues. When the
IRS audits recipients of the low-income taxpayer benefits, its
standard practice is to freeze at least part of the refund at the
agency level, send the taxpayer a letter requesting documents,
and only release the money upon satisfactory receipt.216 This
process may not satisfy the due process dictates following
Mathews. Additionally, Form CP-75 may violate the statutory
“right to be informed.” As discussed above, in denying an
application for benefits, the government’s notice and hearing
processes must comport with procedural due process.
To satisfy procedural due process, notices for low-income
benefits must “provide claimants with enough information to
understand the reasons for the agency’s action.”217 In particular,
See supra Section I.A.1.
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 19, at slide 2.
217 Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d. 105, 123–24 (2nd Cir. 2004) (citing Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970)) (“This requirement, like the right to a fair hearing,
215
216
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according to the Sixth Circuit the notice must include “(1) a
detailed statement of the intended action . . . ; (2) the reason for
the change in status . . . ; (3) citation to the specific statutory
section requiring reduction or termination; and (4) specific
notice of the recipient’s right to appeal.”218 The documentation
notice does not include all four of those items.219 It arguably only
includes the fourth.
First, the notice does not indicate that, if the respondent
fails to respond, she will not receive the disputed part of the
refund. In the survey experiment described below, more than
fifty percent of applicants answered incorrectly when asked the
consequences of failing to provide the documents.220 The letter
says that the IRS is “holding” the refund, and that the agency
“[will] disallow” the items being claimed.221 Does “holding” the
refund mean that the IRS will send the taxpayer part of it
eventually? Under what circumstances? The letter is not clear.
Further, the letter does not say how much of the refund
the IRS is “holding.” Determining how much of a refund is
attributable to a particular exclusion, credit or deduction
requires an elaborate reverse calculation on the tax return. The
language obscures the fact that, if the recipient does not reply
and does not file a petition in Tax Court, the IRS will deny him
a set amount of benefit, usually anywhere from several hundred
to several thousand dollars.222 As the final part of the paper will
discuss, the results of the survey experiment conducted here
suggest that not understanding the consequences of failing to
reply to the audit letter may be a primary reason why the
majority of recipients do not in fact do so.
Second, this notice does not indicate why the IRS has
opened an audit. The letter refers to more than one credit, so the
taxpayer has no way to know where the problem lies if they have
is a basic requirement of procedural due process. Claimants cannot know whether to
challenge to an agency’s action is warranted, much less formulate an effective challenge,
if they are not provided with sufficient information to understand the basis for the
agency’s action.” (emphasis added)).
218 Garrett v. Puett, 707 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1983).
219 Internal
Revenue Service Form CP-75 [hereinafter Form CP-75],
https://www.irs.gov/pub/notices/cp75_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/95UN-23LE].
220 See infra Section II.B.
221 Form CP-75, supra note 219.
222 After the taxpayer receives the CP-75, if he does not respond within 30 days,
he will get a “Notice of Deficiency,” which reveals how much the IRS is holding along
with any additional tax he owes. Then, he has 90 days to file a petition in Tax Court if
he wants to contest that assessment. By the time the 30 days is over, he has exhausted
his administrative remedies. For the IRS’s interpretation of this process, see Telephone
Interview with Nancy LeBlanc, Campus Correspondence & Audit Resolution Process,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 14, 2010), http://www.tax.gov/Professional/Collections/
CampusCorrespondenceAuditProcessResolution [https://perma.cc/DH89-6NQK].
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applied for more than one credit. Courts have specifically held that
notices mentioning multiple potential reasons for the “change in
status” do not comply with the second notice requirement.223 Form
CP-75 is a step behind reasons; it does not even say which
program’s status is at issue. The notices that courts have found
inadequate, as reprinted in case law, at least all indicate which
program they concern, such as “Food Assistance Program” or New
York “Home Energy Assistance Program.”224 Also, it becomes
impossible for the taxpayer to calculate how much money the IRS
is in fact “holding” if the taxpayer has no idea which benefit the
agency is denying.
Third, and perhaps most facially puzzling, the letter does
not mention any statutory sections.
Fourth, the IRS attaches to this letter Document 3498-A,
an eight-page description of the correspondence audit process.225
The table of contents lists page five as about “the appeals
process.”226 Some might argue that the ensuing material is a bit
confusing, but the header is clear enough.
Representatives of low-income taxpayers who are more
intimately familiar with problems these taxpayers normally
encounter are best situated to evaluate potential additional ways
IRS procedures violate taxpayer rights.227 Another example that
springs to mind from just scanning the relevant legislation, forms,
See, e.g., Barry v. Corrigan, 79 F. Supp. 3d 712, 741–43 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
Id. at 742; Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d. 105, 109–10 (2nd Cir. 2004).
225 See generally Internal Revenue Service, Form 3498-A, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p3498a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YGB-K2DV].
226 Id. at 1.
227 For outstanding discussions of tax procedure and how it might affect the
rights of low-income taxpayers, see generally Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS
Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX. REV. 517 (2012);
Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working
Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103 (2006); Leslie Book, The Poor and
Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1145 (2003); Leslie Book,
The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351
(2002); Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrate State, 84
IND. L.J. 57 (2009); Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV.
1 (2004); Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection
Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 (2008); Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction
Over Due Process Collection Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453 (2003);
Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An
Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1235 (2006); Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General
Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 183 (1996);
Leslie Book, Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 20 STAN. LAW & POL’Y REV. 85
(2009); Leslie Book, A Response to Professor Camp: The Importance of Oversight,
(Villanova Univ. Charles Widger Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2008-21, 2008),
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1126&context=wp
s [https://perma.cc/944N-UJC4]; PROCEDURALLY TAXING, http://procedurallytaxing.com/
[https://perma.cc/U6VW-JXW7].
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and government-benefits cases is the fact that the IRS may further
violate the “right to be informed in the way it explains its decision
to audit a taxpayer. The “right to be informed” incorporates Section
3503 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.228 Under
this section, the IRS must, in its Publication 1, include “a statement
which sets forth in simple and nontechnical terms the criteria and
procedures for selecting taxpayers for examination[,] . . . including
whether taxpayers are selected for examination on the basis of
information available in the media or on the basis of information
provided to the Internal Revenue Service by informants.”229
Publication 1 currently states,
The process of selecting a return for examination usually begins in one
of two ways. First, we use computer programs to identify returns that
may have incorrect amounts. These programs may be based on
information returns, such as Forms 1099 and W-2, on studies of past
examinations, or on certain issues identified by compliance projects.
Second, we use information from outside sources that indicates that a
return may have incorrect amounts. These sources may include
newspapers, public records, and individuals. If we determine that the
information is accurate and reliable, we may use it to select a return
for examination.230

Beyond what this publication states, neither low-income
taxpayers, nor their advocates know very much about how IRS
selects returns for audit. Not even experts writing the tax
literature appear to know very much about that issue. Selection
appears to stem from computer matching and the nature of the
credit for which the person applied.231 Audit risk rise when an
individual claims the EITC in the first place because the IRS
perceives EITC fraud as widespread. Taking advantage of the
EITC is in fact a criterion for selecting taxpayers for audit,232 yet
that is not evident from the Publication 1 language. The right to
be informed suggests that the IRS should tell taxpayers before
they take the EITC that they are significantly raising their
chance of audit, and telling taxpayers this after the audit is in
progress certainly falls within this statutory requirement about
audit criteria. Additionally, the definition of a “compliance
project” is not entirely apparent, and it strains credulity that the
IRS takes the position that this is a “simple and nontechnical”

TOWARD A MORE PERFECT TAX SYSTEM, supra note 188, at 52.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, § 3503(a), 112 Stat. 685, 771.
230 TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 190.
231 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 169, at 255–56, 260.
232 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 95–110
(2012), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf.
228
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term, as required by the legislation, when tax experts like myself
have to conduct research to ascertain the definition.233
Further, even in the benefits context where statutes may
be less specific about rights to be informed, courts have been
skeptical of denials based on computer matching programs.234
For example, in Febus v. Gallant, a Massachusetts district court
considered a situation in which a public-assistance agency was
terminating benefits if it found the recipient’s Social Security
number on another state’s rolls. Yet “[n]o effort was made by
defendant to confirm actual duplication of benefits in two
jurisdictions.”235 The court issued an injunction, ordering the
department to refrain from terminating benefits under this
process because the risk of improper termination was too high,
and that the termination notice failed to comply with due
process and minimal statutory notice requirements.236 The same
is true here, and moreover, taxpayers have a specific statutory
right to know the criteria the IRS is using to select her for audit.
B.

Tax Rights in Policy Design

In addition to offering opportunities for poverty-law
advocacy through individual disputes, the taxpayer rights
landscape leaves open the option to use these rights in policy
design in both the legislative and administrative arenas. This is
the area most fruitful for further academic research, and the
final subpart of this paper considers several possibilities for
doing so and will present results of a pilot survey-experiment
exploring one of them.
The academic literature has not yet examined taxpayer
rights to the extent necessary to consider how best to use them
in law and policy design. The annual report from the Office of
the National Taxpayer Advocate, however, points to some key
possibilities. As a longtime proponent of the taxpayer rights
framework, this independent figure within the IRS makes
important policy recommendations to Congress and the agency
each year, presumably with low-income taxpayers in mind and
couches them specifically in the 2014 Taxpayer Bill of Rights.
For example, the bulk of low-income taxpayer audits are
correspondence audits, in which the taxpayer receives the abovedescribed letter. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3503.
For a description of this case law, see Danielle Keats Citron, Technological
Due Process, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 1249 (2008).
235 Febus v. Gallant, 866 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (D. Mass. 1994).
236 Id. at 47.
233
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Administration found that regarding the EITC, while “60 [percent]
of EITC audits are conducted by correspondence before the
credit[ ] , . . . 70 [percent] do not respond to the audit inquiry letters
[from the IRS], resulting in an EITC denial.”237 Further and
perhaps most troubling, the Taxpayer Advocate found that, in a
sample she selected “of these cases closed because there was ‘no
response’ from the taxpayer, approximately 43 [percent] of
taxpayers [eventually] prevailed at audit reconsideration and had
some or all of the EITC restored.”238 The fact that the majority of
recipients of the correspondence audit letters do not reply, and that
of that group, almost half may have a right to that credit, is
disturbing and is particularly problematic given that, as discussed
above, these correspondence audit letters may violate taxpayer’s
due process rights239Even more troubling, the Taxpayer Advocate
finds that taxpayers who do contest their correspondence audit
often encounter erroneous decisions. In approximately 20 percent
of the cases studied, the examiner who received documents from a
taxpayer rejected them as insufficient, only to have the IRS’s
Appeals division or Chief Counsel’s office accept them.240
Additionally, in 5 percent of cases that reached Tax Court, the IRS
had to concede in full because the examiner handling the audit had
made a mistake of law.241
Given these problems with EITC audits, the most recent
National Taxpayer Advocate’s office report to Congress made six
rights-based suggestions for improvement. For example, it
recommended that the IRS “[c]onduct an EITC pilot with three
different treatments: a regular correspondence examination, an
office audit, and a correspondence examination with one auditor
assigned.”242 It “should measure the following: direct time on
case, no response/drop-out rate, agreed to rate, audit
reconsideration rate, and future compliance rate.”243 In addition,
“one employee should be assigned to the taxpayer’s case until it is
237 Michelle Lyon Drumbi, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t and Those Who
Know Better Balancing Complexity, Sophistication and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11
PITT. TAX REV. 113, 137 (citing NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 83 (2011), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2011-annualreport/TAS_arc_2011_vol_2.pdf).
238 Id. at 137–38 (quoting NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 237, at 83).
239 See supra Section II.A.
240 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: TAS
RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 89 (2012); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT: THE IRS INAPPROPRIATELY BANS MANY TAXPAYERS FROM CLAIMING
EITC (2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/EARNEDINCOME-TAX-CREDIT-The-IRS-Inappropriately-Bans-Many-Taxpayers-from-ClaimingEITC.pdf.
241 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 240, at 77.
242 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 169, at 260.
243 Id.
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resolved.”244 Then, “[i]f the taxpayer calls back, he or she could
have the option to speak to the next available employee or wait
for the assigned employee to call back.”245 Further, “[t]he IRS
should hire employees with a social work background or train
existing auditors to conduct the audit.”246 According to the
Taxpayer Advocate, these EITC audit issues affect taxpayers’
“right to be informed,” “right to pay no more than the correct
amount of tax,” “right to challenge the IRS and be heard, “right to
retain representation and “right to a fair and just tax system.”247
Similarly, the National Taxpayer Advocate has raised
rights-based concerns about refund freezing.248 In its report to
Congress it found that “the IRS’s screening processes in this
program continue to harm taxpayers with legitimate returns.”249
The data that the report analyzed found a “‘false positive’ rate
almost 35 percent” in 2015.250 Taxpayers often cannot figure out
if and why the IRS froze the refund. The program “does not have
a dedicated phone number for taxpayers to call.”251 For this
reason, “taxpayers whose refunds are frozen face lengthy hold
times and courtesy disconnects trying to reach IRS Customer
Service representatives . . . on a general line.”252 There was a
mere 38.1 percent likelihood of getting a live employee on the
phone in 2015, down from 64.9 percent in 2014.253 To address
these problems, the Taxpayer Advocate Service made six
recommendations in 2015, such as, “Reinstate the Pre-Refund
Program Executive Steering Committee to coordinate policy and
other service-wide processes and business rules and include TAS
in the steering committees as a charter voting member” and to
“[e]stablish target false positive rates for each process and filter
and create a process to adjust selection rates so that the false
positive rates do not exceed the target rate.”254 In making these
recommendations, the Taxpayer Advocate deemphasized that
the refund freezing program affects taxpayers’ “right to be
informed,” “right to quality service,” “right to challenge the IRS’s
position and be heard.”255
Id.
Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 248.
248 It is not clear from reading this report whether these refund-freezing rates
include everyone whose EITC, child credit or premium credit got frozen.
249 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 169, at 45.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 52.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 55.
255 Id. at 45.
244
245
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One research question that these recommendations
opens concerns which rights-based interventions might be most
effective in actually protecting the rights of low-income
individuals through the tax system. There is very little evidence
on this point. The literature on access to justice issues more
generally, however, has just started to discover that data,
particularly data gathered in randomized controlled trials
(RCTs), can help identify low-cost ways to promote low-income
individuals’ rights within the justice system. Researchers
through Harvard’s Access to Justice Lab have recently
conducted RCTs to evaluate various legal-assistance tools. They
have looked at housing,256 consumer debt,257 and unemployment
appeals.258 They argue that
the United States would be a better place if the legal profession were less
hostile to objective, rigorous, scientific evidence about causation and the
effectiveness of interventions. We think all this particularly true in the
areas of (i) interventions for individuals unable to hire attorneys to
address their legal problems, civil or criminal, transactional or litigation,
and (ii) the construction and administration of adjudicatory systems.
These two arenas, unlike those in which legal professionals and judges
compete for business, lack the discipline that markets can sometimes
impose on inefficient or wasteful practices.259

Among their various projects, Access to Justice Lab
researchers Professors D. James Greiner and Andrea D.
Mathews have conducted a field RCT to identify interventions
that might lead low-income defendants to appear in bankruptcy
court to prevent receiving default judgments.260 Professors
Greiner and Mathews contend that “one of the most existential
threats to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the United States
256 See generally D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan
Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013);
D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan Hennessy, How Effective
are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts
Housing Court (unpublished manuscript) (2012), http://a2jlab.org/publications/completedlab-studies/ [https://perma.cc/43G3-BR34].
257 See generally D. James Greiner, Dalié Jiménez, & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help,
Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119 (2017); Dalié Jiménez et al., Improving the Lives of
Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research and
Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 449 (2013).
258 See generally D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak,
Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer
and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012).
259 D. James Greiner & Andrea Matthews, Randomized Control Trials in the United
States Legal Profession 2 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 16-06, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726614 [https://perma.cc/6J6E-CYZS].
260 D. James Greiner & Andrea Mathews, The Problem of Default Part 1
(unpublished manuscript) (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2622140
[https://perma.cc/RQ4F-D477].
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adversarial model of litigation comes from an obvious and everyday
occurrence: routine default.”261 They clarify that “[b]y default, we
mean when a plaintiff wins an adjudicatory contest because the
defendant fails to appear to contest it.”262 To them, “[r]outine
defendant default may be a greater threat to the legitimacy of
United States adjudicatory systems than is a routine failure, or
perhaps a routine inability, of putative plaintiffs to bring claims to
the formal legal system.”263 This is so because, while with “both a
defendant’s default and a plaintiff’s inability to file, no battle is
joined, and thus an adversarial model has little hope of producing
‘truth.’”264 “But only in the former does the system, despite the
absence of a battle, publicly declare a winner.”265 Further, “[r]outine
default by human being defendants may also be a symptom of an
access to civil justice problem[,] [p]articularly when there is reason
to believe that defenses (perhaps excellent ones)” exist.266 To
combat this problem, Professors Greiner and Matthews sent
carefully designed mailers to defendants in bankruptcy cases
which explained in cartoon form, using a friendly character named
“Blob,” the steps to appearing in court.267 There was a 12 [percent]
increase in court appearances for individuals who received some
form of the Blob mailer.268
Perhaps given the rising importance of RCTs and the
seriousness of low-income taxpayer audit issues, Congress has
similarly called for the IRS to experiment with potential
interventions regarding EITC compliance.269 Currently, four
experiments are in progress as part of this initiative, and the
Treasury issued a report this summer on its progress so far.270 In
addition, the National Taxpayer Advocate is itself carrying out an

261 Id. For more on people who simply do not contest legal outcomes, see Rebecca
L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of
Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW & SOCIAL PROCESS 123 (Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy
Buck, Nigel Balmer, eds., 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1599755 [https://perma.cc/PN8C-2BHL]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Discussion
Paper No. 656: Negative- Expected-Value Suits, (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law,
Econ., & Bus. Discussion Paper No. 656, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_656.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ETJ-2EQ5].
262 Greiner & Matthews, supra note 260, at 2.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 2–3 (footnote omitted).
267 See generally id.
268 Id. at 30.
269 See
generally U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
STRENGTHENING EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT COMPLIANCE THROUGH DATA DRIVEN
ANALYSIS (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ReportEITC-Data-Driven-Compliance-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6TG-SUDQ].
270 Id.
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RCT regarding EITC compliance and education.271 In contrast to
the academic RCTs, the government experiments are distinctly
aimed at improving compliance.272 The government is—
unsurprisingly—particularly interested in enforcing the law. In
addition, the IRS is well-situated to study questions whose answers
require assessing penalties or accessing taxpayer information.
The first of the federal government’s experimental efforts
concerns one of the IRS’s preferred approaches to low-income
taxpayer issues: influencing tax preparer behavior.273 It involves a
variety of treatments for tax preparers including visits “by revenue
agents to review preparers’ compliance with due diligence
requirements” and assess penalties, “[k]nock and [t]alk” visits to
preparers by agents and criminal investigator, post-filing season
audits and a variety of letters.274 The study has indicated that it
found both visits and issue-specific letters to be “effective.”275
The second IRS experiment concerns taxpayers who fill out
their own returns and claim the EITC.276 It tests additional
questions on tax preparation software Taxpayers in the treatment
group used “a version of the tax preparation software that includes
additional questions related to the residency test: taxpayers were
asked to confirm they lived with each child claimed for the EITC
for more than half the year and to provide the address at which
they lived with these children the longest.”277 The treatment
software “also provided clear language explaining that the IRS
might ask for documentation to substantiate residency, and forced
taxpayers to actively certify that the information they provided was
correct.”278 The IRS reported to Congress that there was no
evidence the additional questions influenced taxpayer behavior.279
The third IRS experiment used “soft notices” to notify
non-audited taxpayers of potential compliance problems.280 The
IRS’s “Dependent Database” “combines data from IRS and thirdparty sources such as the Social Security Administration and the
271 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: TAS
RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 31–47 (2017), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/
Default/Documents/2016-ARC/ARC16_Volume2.pdf.
272 U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., supra note 269, at 1.
273 Id. at 2–12.
274 Id. at 5.
275 Id. at 9–12.
276 Id. at 12–14.
277 Id. at 13.
278 Id.
279 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH IMPROPER PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS
(2018) 10, https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/201840032fr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6C5A-25TY].
280 Id. at 14–16.
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Federal Case Registry.”281 The IRS uses this database to “score”
taxpayers “for the probability of noncompliance” and in many
cases, audits them.282 Interestingly, “some segments of the
population identified by DDb as making potentially erroneous
EITC claims are unable to be examined by IRS due to limited
audit resources.”283 This experiment sends members of those
“segments” “soft notices” “identifying a potential compliance
issue and providing instructions for self-correction” and
determines if the DDb identifies the same taxpayers again in
following years.284 The IRS found that the notices had a small
but significant effect on taxpayer compliance.285
Along similar lines the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate
independently “develop[ed] a study to evaluate the compliance
impact of outreach on potentially noncompliant [EITC] taxpayers.”
in 2016.286 This study “identif[ied] taxpayers who were not audited
in 2015, but who had similar risk scores to taxpayers who were
audited” and drew “representative samples from this population to
create separate control and test groups.”287 The office then
“develop[ed] letters highlighting potential noncompliance concerns
and sen[t] them to the test group of taxpayers at the beginning of
the 2016 filing season.”288 The plan was then to “estimate the
compliance of each of the above groups (i.e., the test group, the
control group, and the group composed of taxpayers audited in
2015).”289 The Taxpayer Advocate found that receiving the letter
did in fact affect future noncompliance.290
The final experiment tested whether a “soft-touch
postcard from the IRS could reduce income misreporting and
improve EITC compliance.”291 This experiment mailed
individuals with self-employment income postcards saying that
“all business income must be reported and only allowable
Id. at 14.
Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 15–16.
285 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL
YEAR
2018
73–74
(2017),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018JRC/JRC18_Volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6YX-SU3R].
286 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL
YEAR 2016 95 (2015), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/
2016-JRC/Volume_1.pdf.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)-TAS Study Finds Informing Taxpayers Can
Help Avert Future Noncompliance, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV.: NTA BLOG (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-eitc-TPLetters-avert-noncompliance.
291 U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS, supra note 269, at 17.
281
282
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business expenses can be deducted.”292 The postcard also
“remind[ed] taxpayers that it is not permissible to maximize
EITC benefits by claiming less than the full amount of eligible
business expenses . . . [and] inform[ed] readers of penalties for
both taxpayers and tax preparers for intentional errors in
claiming EITC benefits.”293 Initial results were supposed to come
out in August of 2016 but have not emerged yet.294
To respond further to the call for more experimental data
in law reform as well as to incorporate the Congressional demand
for information about EITC audits, and, perhaps most importantly
here, to take a first step toward assessing how to use taxpayer
rights in low-income tax policy design, I will now present a pilot
survey experiment. Its goal is different from the goals of the
government experiments. Rather than test compliance, my
experiment explores how to protect low-income taxpayer rights
more effectively and improve access to justice in the tax context.
This experiment considers how explicit attention to
rights issues might solve one of the most pressing problems in
the low-income taxpayer context: lack of responses to the
correspondence audit letter, Form CP-75. I decided to begin to
explore taxpayer rights and policy design in this context for
three reasons. First, 60–70 percent of recipients, a substantial
number of whom may have legitimate substantiating documents
or other good legal defenses, are not responding to this letter.
Second, as discussed above, the letter may present procedural
due-process and statutory-rights concerns. The IRS may need to
change this letter to comport with the dictates of Goldberg,
Mathews and their progeny. Procedural due process does not
depend on effect size. If the letter violates taxpayer rights, the
IRS must bring the letter into compliance with the law
regardless of potential impact on taxpayer behavior. I was also
interested in whether a letter that better protected the rights of
poor taxpayers would have the additional upside of coaxing out
replies. Third, the IRS faces major funding shortfalls. Often, the
IRS cannot afford to implement good policy reforms. On one
hand, during the welfare-rights era, the Goldberg court in
particular found that government agencies have to provide due
process to citizens, even if doing so is very expensive. On the
other hand, cost is an explicit part of the Mathews test. In
addition, the problem with the letter is one of many problems
the IRS is facing. I wanted to see if it would be possible to
292
293
294

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
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address this one issue without significantly impacting the IRS
budget. Altering the text of a single letter that the IRS already
sends seemed as if it would not be an enormous additional
expense. Here, I present a brief pilot study around this issue.
For this pilot, I worked with the survey research firm
Qualtrics Research Services to recruit approximately nine
hundred eligible taxpayers with children and household incomes
under $50,000 a year. I selected this population in an attempt to
mirror the group that already gets the letter in the context of the
EITC, Child Tax Credit and Premium Tax Credit.
I randomly assigned respondents into one of four groups.
The first was the control. I showed its members the existing letter
which opens with the header “We’re auditing your Form 1040.” The
second got a version of the letter that was identical except that the
header did not mention an audit and instead said, “Tax return
information needed.” I designed this condition because, while I am
primarily interested in rights-based interventions, I wondered if
the mere word “audit” was confusing or scared respondents away
from reading the letter. The next two conditions focused on rights.
The third group saw a letter that was identical to the control but
with the header, “You have the right to the correct amount of tax
refund.” I took this language from Taxpayer Bill of Rights #3,
which the correspondence audit process implicates, but re-worded
in what I believed was a somewhat more accessible way. The fourth
group received a letter nearly identical to the control but had the
actual right, “You have a right to pay no more than the correct
amount of tax” in the header.
I asked all respondents the same questions about
whichever form they had just seen and I instructed them to
assume they had received it in the mail. The questions
attempted to assess how well readers understood the letter and
what they thought about it. I first asked a multiple-choice
question, “How long would you have to respond to the letter?” I
gave options of fifteen days, thirty days (correct), sixty days,
ninety days and one year. Then, I asked a true/false question:
“True/false. The letter asks you to call the IRS.” The letter
requires documents, not a call. The IRS customer-service
number is printed on the letter, but does not instruct the
recipient to call it, and in fact, if he does call, chances are no one
will pick up the phone.295 Next, I asked another true/false
295 Brad Tuttle, IRS Customer Service Is Even Worse Than You Thought, TIME
(July 16, 2015), http://time.com/money/3960833/irs-customer-service-phone-calls/ [https://
perma.cc/A48X-XMRU] (citing a study that only 37 percent of calls made to the IRS
customer-service number were answered from January to April 2015).
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question, “True/false. The letter is asking you to provide the IRS
with documents.” That one was true.
After that, I asked another multiple-choice question: “If
you received the letter in the mail but did not follow its
instructions, which of the following would be true?” The options
were, “You would receive the full tax refund you filed for,” or,
“You would receive a tax refund but it would be smaller than the
amount you filed for,” or “You would not receive a tax refund.”
Along the same lines, I asked “If you provided the requested
documentation, how likely do you think it is that you would
receive some or all of your tax refund?” I wrote these questions
with an eye toward the premise from the post-Mathews case law
that, to exercise one’s due process rights with regard to a
property interest, a benefits recipient must understand precisely
the government’s proposed action with regard to that interest.
Then given that I could not, with this short pilot, actually
measure reply rates, I asked respondents how likely they would
be to answer the letter.
The final question attempted to approach recipients’
property right to their refund from another angle. If recipients have
a full property interest in their tax refund, they should be able to
assign that interest to someone else. In particular, they could
assign part of it to a commercial third-party who could comply with
the cumbersome documentation requirement for them. Under this
structure, the third party would pay an amount equal to some
percent of the refund up front to the taxpayer. In exchange, the
taxpayer would assign her full rights in the refund to the third
party, who could then expend the time and expertise developed
around the documentation requirements to pursue the audit. As
discussed above, in many of these cases, the taxpayers do have good
legal claims but lack the knowledge or cultural capital to engage
successfully in the dispute with the IRS. As a result, a
commercial third party who had those options might be willing
to purchase that claim. Informal and brief inquiry into the
behavioral economics literature suggests that this kind of
intervention is perhaps most likely to get responses from
individuals who would otherwise ignore letters from government
agencies. This proposal is, of course, a bit more complicated to
test and implement than a minor edit to letter text, but I wanted
to take this survey as a chance to gauge interest.
I then developed several hypotheses. I expected respondents
to understand the letter reasonably well, but not to recognize in full
the consequences of not responding. In particular, I hypothesized
that a significant majority of respondents in all four test groups
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would understand that they had thirty days to reply to the letter and
that they were supposed to provide documents rather than call.
My second hypothesis was that informing taxpayers
about their rights would make them more likely to more closely
read the letter. I expected that a small majority would say that
they needed to send in the documents to get the refund, but that
the percent of correct responses would be larger in the condition
with the “rights” language.
My third hypothesis was that, across all conditions, if
respondents believed that they needed to reply with documents to
get the refund, they would report increased willingness to provide
those documents. This hypothesis stemmed from due-process
notice requirements and the premise that informing government
beneficiaries of precise proposed government actions is necessary
for people to exercise their due process rights.296
The results were as follows:
FIGURE 1: PERCEIVED LENGTH OF REPLY PERIOD

FIGURE 2: PERCEIVED PHONE CALL REQUIREMENT, ALL
CONDITIONS

296 I did not have a hypothesis about whether people would be interested in
trying to assign part of their refund in exchange for money up front; this question was
purely exploratory.
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FIGURE 3: PERCEIVED PHONE CALL REQUIREMENT, SORTED BY
CONDITION297

FIGURE 4: PERCEIVED DOCUMENT REQUIREMENT, ALL
CONDITIONS

The figures above display the results concerning the first
three questions, and my first hypothesis (that people would
understand the letter reasonably well). They provide some
support for what I hypothesized. Figure 1 shows that almost 80
percent of respondents answered correctly that they had 30 days
to reply to the letter. The answers did not vary across
experimental conditions. That was consistent with my
hypothesis that a substantial majority of respondents in all
conditions would understand that part of Form CP-75.
Figure 2 indicates the percent of respondents in all
conditions that thought that Form CP-75 asks for a phone
response. Approximately 60 percent of respondents answered
gave the correct answer of “false.” That figure is consistent with
my second hypothesis that most people would also understand
this part of the letter. The 60 percent number, however, is
perhaps a bit lower than I would have anticipated. Figure 3
297 The “TABOR” condition is the one with the language taken directly from the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights, see supra Section I.B.3.
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shows that individuals who saw the rights language from the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights displayed right on top of their letter were
the least likely to give the incorrect reply, although the
difference was not significant at the 5 percent level. Figure 4
shows the percent of respondents who correctly replied that the
letter asks for documents. Over 80 percent did, which is, again,
consistent with my first hypothesis.
FIGURE 5: PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF NONRESPONSE

Figure 5 shows how respondents perceived the
consequences of failure to reply to Form CP-75. These results
provide limited support for my second hypothesis. About half of
the taxpayers surveyed understood that not replying to the
letter meant that they would not receive any more money from
the IRS. I had expected a somewhat higher rate of correct
answers, but I did anticipate that the rate would be lower than
the correct response rate for the first three questions, where
correct responses are easier to glean from Form CP-75. I did
predict, however, that the correct response rate would be higher
in the conditions with rights language, and in fact there was no
meaningful difference across conditions.
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FIGURE 6: LIKELIHOOD OF RESPONSE, BY PERCEIVED
CONSEQUENCE OF NONRESPONSE

Figure 6 shows how likely respondents said they would
be to reply to Form CP-75, sorted by perceived consequences are
of not replying. These data provide support for my third
hypothesis. Respondents who still believed that they would
receive a full refund even if they do not reply were significantly
less likely to do so. On a 7-point scale, respondents who thought
they would get the full refund regardless rated their likelihood
of replying to the letter at about 5.75 on average. In contrast,
when individuals understood that failure to comply with Form
CP-75 had refund consequences, they rated their likelihood of
replying at an average of about 6.55. This difference was
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
FIGURE 7: LIKELIHOOD OF USING REFUND ASSIGNMENT
PROGRAM
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Finally, Figure 7 displays how likely respondents say
they would be to use a program that would allow taxpayers to
assign their rights to their refunds to commercial third parties.
In exchange, the third parties would, with taxpayer consent,
track down the required documentation and resolve the audit.
About 40 percent of surveyed individuals reported they would be
likely to use this program, with about 15 percent replying that
they would be “extremely likely to do so.”
The results of this experiment suggest how Form CP-75
might incorporate rights-based considerations. In addition, the
results suggest how a field RCT might explore this question
further. The data highlight three particular directions for future
proposed interventions. First, and most basically, readers seem
to have trouble understanding this letter. Respondents in this
survey experiment performed most successfully on the question
about the deadline. That question, however, only required them
to spot a number within the letter’s text, it was not necessary for
them to comprehend any of the written substance of the text.
Even so, almost 20 percent got the question wrong. Put in realworld terms, with regard to the EITC alone, about 500,000
taxpayers received this letter in 2014. The fact that 100,000 may
not have correctly identified the response deadline indicates
there is room for improvement. Further, respondents had a
harder time with the questions about how they needed to
comply. Almost 50 percent did not understand what would
happen if they failed to do so. This result also indicates a need
for clearer IRS instructions. Further research could test
different kinds of instructions to see which, if any, yield more
consistent understanding.
Second, how likely respondents said they would be to
comply with Form CP-75 was negatively associated with
whether they thought doing so would affect their refund.
Readers were less likely to plan to reply if they thought they
would get the full refund anyway. This was not an experimental
effect, so we cannot infer causality. Yet, the result suggests that
future research should explore the relationship between
taxpayer behavior and its understood consequences in the lowincome taxpayer context. Some of the 60–70 percent
nonresponse rate may because taxpayers do not understand why
they should answer Form CP-75. Future research should
experiment with different ways of explaining this to taxpayers.
This question also bears on due process concerns outside
of tax. Procedural due process case law mandates that notices to
individuals include specific information about proposed

2018]

THE NEW WELFARE RIGHTS

931

government action on the premise that rights holders need that
information to contest the action. If an absence of specific
information does in fact lead to inaction, demonstrates the
empirical basis for this longstanding due process principle.
Notably, while this experiment tested lower-income taxpayers,
these due process rights apply with equal force to upper-income
and business taxpayers. If the IRS determines how to improve
its notices so that they comport better with the dictates of due
process, taxpayers who, for example, invest in low-income
housing will benefit, both in terms of ability to exercise the
rights to which law in entitles them, and in terms of efficiency
gains that will enhance the power of the relevant tax incentives.
CONCLUSION
The War on Poverty in the 1960s and 1970s led to several
landmark cases about the rights that accompany government
benefits. In the decades following, however, efforts to strengthen
low-income individuals’ rights did not capture new territory. In
fact, most legal scholar and historians believe that the law
retreated from the notion of benefits recipients as rights-holders.
That retreat has become particularly dominant in the twenty
years since welfare reform.
At the same time, the federal government was starting a
new war on poverty through the tax code. Those provisions
opened the possibility of tax-based rights for the poor in the U.S.
These rights that accompany tax benefits are procedural dueprocess rights, and they are also substantial taxpayer rights
found in legislation. As developing creatures of relatively recent
legal developments, tax rights also bring with them the promise
of legal change. Taxpayers and their advocates can realize this
potential through individual disputes, and lawmakers can help
taxpayers realize their rights through legislative and
administrative designs that explicitly incorporate rights.

